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STANDING ON HOLY GROUND: HOW
RETHINKING JUSTICIABILITY MIGHT BRING
PEACE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
JOHN M. BICKERS*
ABSTRACT
The Establishment Clause is home to both procedural and substantive disorder.
Particularly when evaluating religious speech by the government, the Supreme Court
has applied a number of distinct tests, with varying degrees of strictness. There has
never been an overarching principle for determining which test would appear at
which time; commentators, and occasionally the Justices themselves, have suspected
that desired results drove the choice of tests. At the same time, the Court has
articulated a series of requirements necessary for a plaintiff to have standing to
challenge government action, only to ignore them in government religious speech
cases. The resulting lack of clarity leaves lower courts to their own devices in
endeavoring to calm increasingly intense struggles. This article sets out a theory that
altering one of these problems might correct the other. Analogizing to the Treaty of
Westphalia’s temporal limit on the airing of grievances, the Supreme Court could
replace the current standing chaos with a limit to claims against current government
activity. Such a rule would foreclose the ability of pro-religion forces to new
domination of the public square, but would also prevent anti-religion forces from
removing the vestiges of past government activity that are central to the American
experience. Current doctrine ends with many of the same results, but doing so under
the standing doctrine would remove the camouflage of alternative substantive tests.
Simultaneously, it would decrease the incentive of participants in the national
political struggle over religion to ever more hostile moves. The clarity this doctrinal
shift would provide could help improve both religious freedom and peace in the
national dialogue.
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I. “THAT FOR MANY YEARS PAST, DISCORDS AND CIVIL DIVISIONS BEING STIR’D
UP”:1 THE MESS THAT IS THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The Establishment Clause2 is a mess. It sometimes seems like everyone says so.3
This is true in widely divergent areas in which the government and religion touch,
1

Treaty of Westphalia (Oct. 24, 1648), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_
century/westphal.asp [hereinafter Westphalia].
2
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
3

Not literally everyone, of course. But Supreme Court Justices and academics alike have
gotten in on the act. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 861 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“our Establishment Clause jurisprudence is in
hopeless disarray”). See also Leslie C. Griffin, Fighting the New Wars of Religion: The Need
for a Tolerant First Amendment, 62 ME. L. REV. 23, 24 (2010) (“the Court’s modern decisions
interpreting those [religion] clauses have shed more heat than light on the discussion and have
provoked ongoing controversy instead of any settled resolution of the issues”).
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from public funding for religious schools4 to government resolution of internal
religious property and employment disputes.5 When the government is itself
speaking or acting in an arguably religious way, the chaos of the Establishment
Clause doctrine is nothing short of remarkable.
It is possible that this doctrinal uncertainty is not all that bad. Much government
religious activity could plausibly be characterized as de minimis, so any alleged
constitutional injury is the equivalent of a flesh wound. Yet constitutional
limitations on government religious speech and conduct—real or imagined—seem to
be among the most contentious issues in our modern republic. This is potentially
grave: widespread public hostility to what is believed to be bad constitutional
practice can only undermine confidence in the Constitution, the government, or both.
In this paper I will suggest that Establishment Clause jurisprudence is rare in that
it contains both procedural and substantive disorder. I will argue that the conflicting
substantive “tests” for the Establishment Clause reflect a desire by courts, especially
the Supreme Court, to reach solutions in difficult cases that seem instinctively
correct.6 In short, the Court will use the test that will allow them to reach the result
that appears—somehow—to be the most appropriate for a particular matter in front
of them. The article will then consider ways in which the procedural rules of the
Establishment Clause, particularly the requirement of standing, represent such
internal contradiction that they beg for reform.7 Such reform is urgent if the Court is
not to resolve the chaos of its own Establishment Clause jurisprudence by simply
withdrawing from the field of battle, leaving it to political forces to determine the
meaning of the Constitution in this area.8
The article offers a different way out. If it is correct that current Establishment
Clause standing doctrine is hopelessly unmoored from any workable standards, it is
possible that a procedural repair could offer some clarity to the substantive issues. I
will suggest that this new standard be one derived from the Treaty of Westphalia, the
1648 agreement that ended the Thirty Years’ War. That treaty endeavored to
achieve a spatial peace by imposing a temporal one; it articulated careful rules for
religion and religious tolerance, but those rules were all designed to be forward4
The Supreme Court’s most recent foray into this particular area, Arizona Christian Sch.
Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011), resisted the temptation to provide clarity in the
area by resolving the question as a matter of standing.
5

Although this area is comparatively slightly more consistent, there are still significant
disputes. Compare Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976) (courts
may not interfere with decisions by hierarchical churches in ecclesiastical matters), with Jones
v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1980) (permitting courts to decide intra-church disputes upon the
basis of “neutral principles of law,” and reading Milivojevich only as prohibiting courts not
from intervening, but from deciding cases on the basis of religious doctrine or practice).
6

See infra Part II.

7

See infra Part III.

8

At least one Justice believes that has in fact happened. “[I]n the context of public
acknowledgments of God there are legitimate competing interests: On the one hand, the
interest of that minority in not feeling “excluded”; but on the other, the interest of the
overwhelming majority of religious believers in being able to give God thanks and
supplication as a people, and with respect to our national endeavors. Our national tradition has
resolved that conflict in favor of the majority.” McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 900
(2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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looking. The treaty drew a curtain over past activities, recognizing that settling
future conflicts would be immeasurably more difficult if each argument tomorrow
could include the refighting of matters settled yesterday. Justice Breyer has hinted at
such a path to religious peace.9 Unfortunately, because he sought a substantive path,
his solution attracted no support among his colleagues. I will suggest that Justice
Breyer’s goal for the Establishment Clause—increasing tolerance and seeking
religious peace—can be sought more effectively by redesigning the standing
doctrine.
If the Supreme Court adopts a rule of standing that imposes a temporal peace,
courts would continue to allow challenges to current forms of government religious
speech. Complaints against speech of the past, such as long-standing monuments,
could not proceed. This standing rule would be the equivalent of applying a
restrictive rule for current government speech, but a much more permissive one for
historical events. As the Court has done essentially this in recent years, there would
be little change in the outcome of the few cases that make their way to the highest
court. But the Court would no longer camouflage such decisions by using alternate
substantive tests without clear reasons. This would leave lower courts and
governmental bodies throughout the nation with a much clearer path before them.
Real peace requires clarity, and clarity is possible through a change in the standing
rules.
II. “THE DISORDERS OF A LONG AND CRUEL WAR”:10 THE SUBSTANTIVE CHAOS OF
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Since the Supreme Court first entered into the fray regarding the Establishment
Clause, it has relied heavily on the proposition that the Constitution requires the
government to remain neutral in the area of religion.11 I have elsewhere argued that
neutrality is impossible, at least in the area of government speech.12 Whether that is
correct or not, it is demonstrably the case that the quest for neutrality has led to the
adoption of a variety of tests that are inconsistent at best and contradictory at worst.
This is especially true when the conduct being measured against the
Establishment Clause is the government’s own speech. Whether it is the display of
religious iconography,13 references to God in the Pledge of Allegiance,14 or the
hiring of chaplains to offer daily prayers,15 the Supreme Court has moved from test
9
10

See infra Part V.A.
Westphalia, supra note 1.

11

This principle is often derived from the pronouncement of the Supreme Court that the
core meaning of the Establishment Clause is that “[n]either a state nor the Federal
Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another.” Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15
(1947).
12

John M. Bickers, Of Non-Horses, Quantum Mechanics, and the Establishment Clause,
57 U. KAN. L. REV. 371 (2009).
13

See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492
U.S. 573 (1989).
14

Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).

15

Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
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to test with inadequate explanations and inconsistent holdings. The entire area
leaves lower court judges adrift,16 unsure how to approach these problems,17 and
often left to their own devices in ways that even they find unappealing.18
A. The Flawed Establishment Clause “Tests”
Establishment Clause doctrines are constitutional orphans, unloved by even those
who use them. Ever since Chief Justice Burger endeavored to impose a logical order
on the smattering of diverse rulings that preceded him, justices19 and scholars20 alike
have expressed displeasure over not only his proposed solution, but also every one
offered in response to it. There may be some profit in quickly surveying Chief
Justice Burger’s test, announced in the oft-mentioned (and oft-vilified) Lemon v.
Kurtzman,21 before proceeding to the other schemes for evaluating Establishment
Clause cases that have been advanced to supplant or augment it. Each offers an
array of failures of its own.
1. Lemon
When plaintiffs challenged the augmentation of salaries of teachers in private
schools in Pennsylvania and Rhode Island (and also textbook support in
Pennsylvania),22 the Supreme Court took the opportunity to try to bring order from
the disorderly stare decisis that existed.23 In a variety of decisions notable for their
sweeping prose, the Court had held that the Establishment Clause allowed public
school districts to pay the public transportation costs of students attending private
(including religious) schools,24 to loan secular textbooks to such schools without
charge,25 or to release public school students during the school day for instruction at
16
Or even in Limbo. See Green v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 450 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1285
(E.D. Okla. 2006) (“the state of the Establishment Clause jurisprudence is hardly Paradise.
Indeed, it may be more akin to Limbo. Dante envisioned Limbo as a place of sorrow without
torment, illuminated by the light of reason and home to virtuous pagans unfit to enter the
kingdom of heaven. Yes, we are definitely in Limbo.”).
17

See, e.g., Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 494 F.3d 494, 500 (5th Cir. 2007)
(DeMoss, J., concurring) (“The Supreme Court cannot continue to speak out of both sides of
its mouth if it intends to provide real guidance to federal courts on this issue.”).
18

See, e.g., ACLU v. Mercer Cnty., 432 F.3d 624 (6th Cir. 2005) (“we remain in
Establishment Clause purgatory.”).
19

See, e.g., McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 900 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“the utter inconsistency of our Establishment Clause jurisprudence”).
20
See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions:
Establishment Neutrality and the ‘No Endorsement’ Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 269 (1987)
(“Although the Lemon test has survived for over a decade and a half, few have found the
formulation satisfactory.”).
21

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).

22

Id. at 607.

23

Id. at 612 (“Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumulative
criteria developed by the Court over many years.”).
24

Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).

25

Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
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religious centers.26 Cities might also grant tax exemptions for real property used
solely for religious purposes.27 On the other hand, the Court had held that the
Establishment Clause prohibited religious instruction by members of the clergy in
public schools.28 The Constitution also forbade beginning each public school day
with an official prayer29 or with a reading of Bible verses,30 and States could not
outlaw the teaching of evolution.31 The opinions offered an array of reasons why,
but they lacked reference to each other in a way that would allow lower court judges
to give confident answers to hard questions.
Just as the Burger Court was to attempt to do for obscenity32 and abortion,33 the
Court sought to combine prior case law and its own constitutional philosophy into a
clear, intelligible, and consistent doctrine. The opinion in Lemon viewed the
precedents as offering three principles to courts in evaluating government
compliance with the Establishment Clause. In its famous formulation, “the statute
must have a secular legislative purpose . . . its principle or primary effect must be
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . [and it] must not foster ‘an
excessive government entanglement with religion.’”34
Purpose and principle effect certainly made a logical pairing in the abstract; act
and intent are routinely linked in the law.35 Even from the initial announcement in
1971, the requirement that the behavior not excessively entangle government and
religion seemed a little disconnected from the other two. The Court believed that it
was required by precedent, though,36 and it turned out to be the pivotal feature of the
Pennsylvania and Rhode Island programs on which the Court was ruling.37
The opinion seems to carry a tone of confidence, a sense that the test would be a
useful one. That confidence has proven to be ill-placed.38 Nonetheless, it was a

26

Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).

27

Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).

28

McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).

29

Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).

30

Abington Twp. Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).

31

Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).

32

See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).

33

See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

34

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397
U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
35

See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).

36

The quotation marks in that portion of the Lemon test are because that language is
drawn verbatim from the Court’s approval, the previous year, of New York’s property tax
exemption for places of religious worship. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S 664, 674 (1970).
37
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 620-21 (“the very restrictions and surveillance necessary to ensure
that teachers play a strictly non-ideological role give rise to entanglements between church
and state.”).
38

See discussion infra Parts II.A.2-II.A.5.
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valiant effort to clarify a confusing doctrine.39 Lemon bravely announced that there
would be a new coherence to the world of church-state relations.
2. History
A decade later, though, that world had apparently changed, albeit with no
fanfare. In 1983, the Supreme Court confronted the Nebraska legislature’s practice
of using public money to hire a chaplain to open each day with a brief devotional
prayer.40 Chief Justice Burger wrote the opinion in the case, concluding that the
program did not violate the Establishment Clause because the practice of opening
legislative sessions with prayer was “deeply embedded in the history and tradition of
this country.”41 Although the majority almost laconically noted that the Eighth
Circuit had found that the Nebraska practice violated all three parts of the Lemon
test,42 the opinion overturning that ruling made no use of that test at all.43 To make
matters worse, the majority opinion came from the pen of Chief Justice Burger, the
author of the Lemon test.
The absence of Lemon in the Marsh recipe served an obvious purpose according
to the skeptics of the majority opinion. The Lemon test, taken seriously, would have
required the Court to prohibit the chaplaincy program. It borders on the incredible to
ascertain a secular purpose for the hiring of chaplain whose only duty is to offer a
prayer to and for lawmakers.44 And while the primary effect of this small gesture
may not have benefitted religion by successfully converting anyone, the dissent
pointed out that the prayers “explicitly link religious beliefs and observance to the
power and prestige of the State.”45 This linkage was heightened by the fact that a
single preacher, from a single denomination of Christianity, had been the chaplain
for sixteen years.46 Finally, there was arguably an entanglement problem as well.
As the dissent noted, the very decision to hire a particular chaplain from a particular
faith involved the government in deciding which faiths were “suitable.”47
39

It survives, commemorated not only by Justice Scalia’s famed characterization of it as a
“ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad,
after being repeatedly killed and buried,” but in the fact that more than 1,700 cases have had
to confront and construe it. Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, A., concurring).
40

Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).

41

Id. at 786.

42

Id.

43

Indeed, Walz, which had been so heavily relied on in formulating the Lemon test, see
supra note 36, was now characterized as notable for the way in which it “considered the
weight to be accorded to history.” Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790.
44

See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 797 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“That the ‘purpose’ of legislative
prayer is preeminently religious rather than secular seems to me to be self-evident. ‘To
invoke Divine guidance on a public body entrusted with making the laws,’ is nothing but a
religious act”).
45

Id. at 798 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

46

Id. at 823 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

47

Id. at 799 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also noted that the majoritarian faith
for any given region would dominate such a selection process.
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Pinned between the reasoning of an appellate court it was overturning and the
attacks of the dissenters, the Court never sought to explain why those views of
Lemon were wrong.48 Neither did it repudiate the Lemon test. After noting the
Eighth Circuit result, Chief Justice Burger simply ignored his own test of twelve
years earlier. That decision may have been a particularly painful blow to Lemon
because of its source, but it was certainly not to be the last event in what would
become the perpetual abuse of Lemon.
3. Endorsement
When Justice Sandra Day O’Connor arrived on the Court, she brought with her
an idea about the Establishment Clause that was distinct from Lemon. In her view,
the real problem that the Establishment Clause was meant to prevent was the threat
that religion would be made relevant in politics, creating increased difficulties in
both areas. Her desire to preserve a religious peace led her to outline a new test, one
that has garnered both admiration and hostility.49
The “endorsement test” she championed sought to prevent the government from
“making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person’s standing in the
political community.”50 Justice O’Connor’s goal was to prevent the government
from sending “a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders . . . and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the
political community.”51 There is an undeniable appeal to this formulation: it calls
out to the best angels of everyone’s natures, and hearkens back to the oldest
constitutional protection of religious liberty, the guarantee of Article VI that “no
religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust
under the United States.”52
Although the Court never explicitly adopted the endorsement test as a substitute
for Lemon,53 it sometimes relied heavily on endorsement. Among the cases in which
Prayers may be said by a Catholic priest in the Massachusetts Legislature and by a
Presbyterian minister in the Nebraska Legislature, but I would not expect to find a
Jehovah’s Witness or a disciple of Mary Baker Eddy or the Reverend Moon serving as
the official chaplain in any state legislature.
Id. at 823 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
48
The majority opinion in Marsh never directly engages the Lemon-based criticisms of the
dissents.
49

See, e.g., Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality Towards Religion Under
the Establishment Clause: The Untapped Potential of Justice O’Connor’s Insight, 64 N.C. L.
REV. 1049 (1986). But cf. Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U.
CHI. L. REV. 115, 192 (1992) (the endorsement test “exacerbates religious division and discord
by heightening the sense of grievance over symbolic injuries.”).
50

Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).

51

Id. at 688.

52

U.S. CONST. art. VI.

53

Indeed, Justice O’Connor herself seemed to view the test as replacing only the first two
elements of Lemon, retaining the “excessive entanglement” prohibition as necessary to
preventing the standing of members of the political community from being affected by their
religion. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-88.
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it appears prominently are one prohibiting the addition of the words “or voluntary
prayer” to an existing state statute authorizing a moment of silence in public schools
“for meditation”54 and another removing a crèche from a courthouse stairway.55 The
test’s apogee may have come in 2000, in a case in which the Court struck down a
high school football pre-game prayer that was to be delivered by the winner of an
election.56 The Court used a variety of tests to find the practice unconstitutional, but
it relied heavily on the idea that the Constitution prohibited the school from sending
“the ancillary message to members of the audience who are nonadherents ‘that they
are outsiders, not full members of the political community.’”57 That the Court used
other tests—generally including Lemon—is certainly true. It is noteworthy, though,
that the endorsement test had become a part of the way to understand the
Establishment Clause. Its repeated appearance suggests that the justices had begun
to see it as a helpful guide to the Establishment Clause, especially in government
speech cases, even though it was not destined to take a position as the “Grand
Unified Theory” of the Establishment Clause.58
Quite probably there were few who thought that the Endorsement Test would
become such a theory, effortlessly solving all establishment clause problems laid
before it. Even in the more limited role it attained, however, it aroused objections.
In a harsh critique of the test, Justice Kennedy outlined a series of noteworthy
governmental religious activities: Presidential proclamations of Thanksgiving,
legislative prayers (and even a National Day of Prayer), and the inclusion of “under
God” in the Pledge of Allegiance.59 He argued that these practices could not
“withstand scrutiny under a faithful application of this [endorsement test] formula.”60
Perhaps defensively, Justice O’Connor responded that there were certain public
acts that constituted only “longstanding government acknowledgements of religion”
and not improper endorsement.61 Labeling these acts “ceremonial deism,” she

54

See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (“In applying the purpose test, it is
appropriate to ask ‘whether government’s actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of
religion.’”) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690).
55

Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989) (“In recent years, we have paid
particularly close attention to whether the challenged governmental practice either has the
purpose or effect of ‘endorsing’ religion, a concern that has long had a place in our
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.”).
56

Sante Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).

57

Id. at 309 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688).

58

The endorsement test’s creator herself introduced this idea into the Court’s
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. See Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 718 (1994)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“It is always appealing to
look for a single test, a Grand Unified Theory that would resolve all the cases under a
particular Clause . . . But the same constitutional principle may operate very differently in
different contexts.”).
59

Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 671-72 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
60

Id. at 670.

61

Id. at 630 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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insisted that they “serve the secular purposes of ‘solemnizing public occasions,’ and
‘expressing confidence in the future.’”62
This is an odd and seemingly ad-hoc exception. It does not seem unreasonable to
think that avowed atheists, and possibly polytheists, receive the message that they
are outsiders when subjected to the sound of raised patriotic voices proclaiming their
commitment to being “one Nation under God.”63 Such a message might also
reasonably be received when these nonadherents function in a nation which makes
both Thanksgiving64 and Christmas65 national holidays, and in which the official
motto declares the nation’s trust in the one God of the Pledge.66
Justice Kennedy’s question—why must objectors and dissenters be free from
religion that alters their standing in the public square, unless the religion in question
is “ceremonial deism”—has never been effectively answered. It cuts religious
identity very thinly to suggest that nonadherents are excluded by the appearance of a
crèche, but not by the legislative celebration of Christmas, or that “in God we trust”
proclaimed on the coins makes no one feel like an outsider, but that similar words
said before a Friday night football game do.
The ceremonial deism exception, ultimately, seems very much a functionalist
device. Difficult to justify theoretically, it appears to rescue the endorsement test
just when application of the test would yield discomfiting results. The existence of
such an exception, like the non-use of Lemon in hard cases, demonstrates that it is
not a test that even its proponents wish to rely on solely.67
4. Coercion
Yet another test offered to combat the perceived failings of Lemon was one
designed to protect all believers from coerced participation in religious activities.68
Although it might be said that this was properly the focus of either the Free Speech
Clause or the Free Exercise Clause rather than the Establishment Clause,69 the
justices who sponsored this view of the Establishment Clause spoke of the Framer’s
desire to use the clause to protect something that was historically often called the
62

Id.

63

4 U.S.C. § 4 (2002); see also Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1
(2004) (the argument that this language constituted religious indoctrination was raised by
Michael Newdow in his suit against the public school his daughter attended).
64

5 U.S.C. § 6103 (1998).

65

Id.

66

36 U.S.C. § 302 (2002).

67

But, cf., Joseph Blocher, Schrödinger’s Cross: The Quantum Mechanics of the
Establishment Clause, 96 VA. L. REV. 51 (2010) (arguing that the endorsement test is valuable
because it removes from judges the responsibility of determining the underlying social
meaning of government religious speech).
68

See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (“It is beyond dispute that, at a
minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or
participate in religion or its exercise . . .”).
69
Intriguingly, Justice Kennedy has argued that the Free Exercise clause “has close
parallels in the speech provisions,” but that the Establishment Clause “has no precise
counterpart in the speech provisions.” Id. at 591.
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“liberty of conscience.”70 To require someone to attend worship service was
obviously unacceptable, as was taxing him or her to support a religious activity.71
On the other hand, if a public university provided funding for publication by a
religious student group, observers would not conclude that the university was doing
the talking, and thus there could be “no real likelihood that the speech . . . [was]
being either endorsed or coerced by the State.”72 Unhappy observers were always
able simply to look away. This approach was typically paired with a requirement of
nondiscrimination: if the government allowed a religious group to use a government
program or facility, that program or facility had to be available to other, similarly
situated religious groups.73
The reliance on “coercion,” even where accompanied by a role for “nondiscrimination,” was ultimately to prove no more successful at unifying
Establishment Clause thought than the Lemon test or the endorsement test had been.
This was displayed decisively during what should perhaps have been coercion’s
triumphant moment. For in relying on coercion to strike down the practice of
inviting a religious speaker to give a non-sectarian prayer at an eighth grade
graduation ceremony,74 the Court aroused the wrath of a previous proponent of that
very rubric. In dissent, Justice Scalia argued that coercion, within the meaning of the
Establishment Clause, was that which was accomplished “by force of law and threat
of penalty.”75 Psychological or peer-pressure coercion was simply not sufficient, in
Justice Scalia’s view, to constitute coercion in violation of the Establishment
Clause.76
70
See, e.g., The Commission of New Hampshire of 1680, quoted in Everson v. Bd. of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, n.6 (1947).
71

Like so many other principles of modern Establishment Clause law, these ideas were
given early voice in Justice Black’s list of “thou shalt nots” issued to the government in the
seminal Everson v. Bd. of Educ.. See id. at 15-16 (“Neither a state nor the Federal
Government . . . can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church . . .
or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion . . . No tax in any amount, large or
small, can be levied to support any religious activities . . .”).
72

Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 842 (1995).

73
Perhaps the easiest “least common denominator” to find agreement among Supreme
Court Justices of diverse ideology is the principle of non-discrimination, from those who seek
a powerful Establishment Clause to those who seek an Establishment Clause more
accommodating toward expression of religion in the public square. Compare Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 281 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[q]uite
obviously, however, the University could not allow a group of Republicans or Presbyterians to
meet while denying Democrats or Mormons the same privilege.”) with Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[t]he Clause was also designed to stop the
Federal Government from asserting a preference for one religious denomination or sect over
others.”). All Justices seem agreed in principle that the government may not allocate benefits
on the basis of faith. See infra Part II.A.5 (for a disturbingly discordant note in this symphony
in the discussion of the “monotheism exception”).
74

Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).

75

Id. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

76

See id. at 642 (arguing that the Court’s error was in seeking a definition of coercion by
reading Freud rather than the “disciples of Blackstone”).
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This divide has brought much attention to the intricacies and failings of the
coercion test.77 For the purposes of this paper, it hardly matters which version of the
test one uses. For whether one is concerned only with official punishment, or takes
into account the group psychology accompanying the government action, it is
difficult to believe that a serious argument exists that coercion should be the only test
in areas of government speech challenged under the Establishment Clause.
A simple thought experiment demonstrates this. Imagine that a group of donors,
troubled by what they perceive as the decline of religion in American society, raises
money for a seventy-five foot tall cross. The cross will bear the following
inscription, in letters three feet high, on its base: “Dedicated in honor of Jesus Christ,
recognizing the American people’s united commitment to the teachings of the Prince
of Ethics.”78 The group wishes to install the cross on the National Mall, and enlists
the help and support of a handful of key members of Congress. Those members add
an amendment granting the group’s wishes to an omnibus budget bill. Other
members may oppose this, but most do not wish to incur the electoral wrath that they
fear will accompany a motion to remove the cross from the bill. The bill passes, and
the cross is duly assembled.
Can it be that a giant symbol of a particular religion, declaring our nation’s
religious unity as members of that faith, does not constitute an establishment of
religion? Few who take the Constitution seriously would say so, and it is difficult to
imagine a favorable result for this act were we able to put it before either the
Framers of the Constitution themselves or the generation that adopted the
Constitution. It certainly would fail both the Lemon and endorsement tests.
Yet it seems that it would pass the coercion test,79 under either its force-of-lawand-threat-of-penalty or peer-pressure-and-psychological-coercion models. No one,
after all, has to look at or admire any particular government monument. Because the
money was private, no taxpayer support contributed to it. Because it is in neither a
residential neighborhood nor a school, no one is captive in its presence. If the
coercion test cannot give a reliable answer to such an extreme hypothetical, its
usefulness in testing government speech under the Establishment Clause cannot be
great.80
77
See, e.g., Mark Strasser, The Coercion Test: On Prayer, Offense, and Doctrinal
Inculcation, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 417, 483 (2009) (after reviewing the modern status of the
test, Professor Strasser concludes that “it is simply unconscionable for the Court to offer such
a confused and confusing jurisprudence.”).
78
This rather rare title for Jesus of Nazareth seems to have first appeared in Supreme
Court jurisprudence with the attempt of some Kentucky counties to post the Ten
Commandments in their courthouses. See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 899
(2005). The title was used in a motion to adjourn the Commonwealth Legislature in 1993 in
honor of Jesus in this capacity.
79

See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, Undoing Neutrality? From Church-State Separation
to Judeo-Christian Tolerance, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 691, 704 (2010) (“A statue of Moroni
in a park owned and administered by an overwhelmingly Mormon city is clearly an
endorsement of Mormonism by the city, but it is not coercive, and thus apparently not a
constitutional violation under Justice Kennedy’s favored Establishment Clause test.”).
80
This is not to say that proponents of the coercion test would vote to allow such a
monument; virtually all are also advocates of a non-discriminatory, non-sectarian model of the
Establishment Clause. A monument so obviously favoring a single religion would
presumably incur their wrath as well. This mental experiment merely demonstrates that the
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5. Monotheism
In the twin Ten Commandments cases of 2005,81 a new theory appeared. Justice
Scalia argued82 that use of the Ten Commandments in American public spaces was
permissible because they represented, not a particular sect that was receiving favored
treatment, but rather an American tradition of support for monotheism.83 Such a
tradition, Justice Scalia proclaimed, was woven into our Constitutional fabric. He
even allowed this rule to perform an exclusionary function: “it is entirely clear from
our Nation’s historical practices that the Establishment Clause permits this disregard
of polytheists and believers in unconcerned deities, just as it permits the disregard of
devout atheists.”84
Onlookers might find themselves either horrified or pleasantly impressed by this
characterization. For those who initially recoil from this formulation, one mitigating
approach could conclude that this understanding of the Establishment Clause is a
cousin, if not a sibling, of the ceremonial deism exception to the endorsement test. It
appears to rely on historical tradition85 and seems to stress a general popularity and
inoffensiveness, just as the ceremonial deism exception did.86
On reflection, though, the “monotheism test” is actually quite different from the
ceremonial deism exception. While ceremonial deism at least demands a broad level
of inoffensive generality, the monotheism approach allows much more government
speech that is sectarian, or at least limited to one or a few faiths. Despite Justice
Scalia’s protestation that the Ten Commandments are, essentially, the same as
ceremonial deism,87 the same day he joined the opinion that acknowledged that “the
Ten Commandments are religious—they were so viewed at their inception and so

coercion test simply does not add any analytical value when considering a case of government
monumental speech.
81
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005); McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844
(2005).
82

McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 885 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

83

See id. at 894 (“Historical practices thus demonstrate that there is a distance between the
acknowledgment of a single Creator and the establishment of a religion.”).
84

Id. at 893.

85

See Kyle Duncan, Bringing Scalia’s Decalogue Dissent Down From the Mountain,
2007 UTAH L. REV. 287 (2007) (arguing that Justice Scalia is merely using the tradition of
monotheism as a historical baseline, and thus deferring to legislatures the primary
responsibility for determining the further development government religious speech).
86
McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 894 (arguing that all three Abrahamic religions venerate
the Ten Commandments and noting that “[t]he three most popular religions in the United
States, Christianity, Judaism, and Islam-which combined account for 97.7% of all believersare monotheistic.”).
87
See id. (Justice Scalia argued that the embrace of the Ten Commandments made them
“indistinguishable, insofar as discriminating against other religions is concerned, from
publicly honoring God.”).
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remain.”88 This list of ten rules is, of course, profoundly religious, and specific to
particular faiths.89
Justice Scalia’s “monotheism test” makes much of a supposed unity of the three
Abrahamic faiths, but he never fully explains why a particular version of these rules
is acceptable under this rubric.90
As Justice Stevens pointed out in response, there is a complete and utter lack of
evidence that the founding generation had a uniform view of what was meant by the
phrase “establishment of religion.”91 Some framers certainly sought a large role for
religion in public life; others shunned it.92 To pretend they had a common view
“stretches the evidence beyond tensile capacity.”93 Indeed, to the extent that some of
the Framers and ratifiers sought an increased place for religion in American public
life, it was not on behalf of some generic, murky monotheism. As Justice Stevens
noted: “history shows that the religion of concern to the Framers was not that of the
monotheistic faiths generally, but Christianity in particular, a fact that no Member of
this Court takes as a premise for construing the Religion Clauses.”94
88
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (reading the Commandments makes this
unavoidably clear: the first four Commandments outline particular requirements of religious
faith and practice).
89

Indeed, there are sectarian differences that matter among the versions of the
Commandments. See id. at 718 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
90
In a fascinating footnote, Justice Scalia acknowledges that there is a potential limit to
the posting of the Ten Commandments. The note rewards consideration in full:

This is not to say that a display of the Ten Commandments could never constitute an
impermissible endorsement of a particular religious view. The Establishment Clause
would prohibit, for example, governmental endorsement of a particular version of the
Decalogue as authoritative. Here the display of the Ten Commandments alongside
eight secular documents, and the plaque’s explanation for their inclusion, make clear
that they were not posted to take sides in a theological dispute.
McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 894, n.4.
Note that the last sentence is oddly disconnected from what precedes it. The choice of a
particular version of the Ten Commandments would be prohibited, the Justice tells us, because
that would be an endorsement of a sect. The display at issue was permissible, though, not
because it did not pick a particular version of the Ten Commandments—which it of course
did—but because it surrounded the commandments with “secular documents.” Thus in this
footnote, he acknowledges as problematic an action that would violate Justice O’Connor’s
endorsement test. He then turns, unironically, to the purpose prong of the Lemon test, as
formulated in Cnty. of Alleghany, to save the display.
91

Id. at 879.

92

Some of the most important figures of our history might well fall into Justice Scalia’s
category of “believers in unconcerned deities,” see FRANK LAMBERT, THE FOUNDING FATHERS
AND THE P LACE OF RELIGION IN AMERICA 159-61 (2003) (identifying a list of Deists that
includes Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and Alexander Hamilton).
93

McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 879.

94

Id. at 880. (Justice Stevens also quotes Justice Story, for whom the Establishment
Clause was meant “not to countenance, much less to advance, Mahometanism, or Judaism, or
infidelity, by prostrating Christianity, but to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects.” Id.).
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This observation shows the real difficulty with the monotheism test. If a
historical exception is carved out for monotheism—indeed, a monotheism seemingly
limited to the three Abrahamic faiths—it is difficult to find either its historical roots
or its contemporary stopping point. Justice Scalia’s spirited writing cannot
overcome a complete lack of evidence that the mostly-Christian Framers uniformly
saw themselves as coreligionists with Jews, to say nothing of Muslims. Those who
sought a favored place for religion sought it for Christianity, not “monotheism.” If
one allowed Justice Scalia’s test to be the standard, though, further thought
experiments demonstrate the difficulty of accepting Abrahamic monotheism as a
test. All three faiths feature angels and devils. Would a national monument praising
angels for their help, or denouncing the works of devils, truly not violate the
Constitution’s prohibition on a law respecting an establishment of religion?95
B. Why the “Tests” Fail
1. Neutrality is Impossible
It is possible, though, that such a test cannot exist. Since the proclamation in
Everson, the Court has sought to impose a condition of neutrality in the area of
religion as a primary mandate of the Establishment Clause.96 I have argued
elsewhere that it is a truth recognized from ancient times that something cannot be
neutral between a thing and its denial: one cannot occupy the ground in between a
horse and a non-horse, because no such ground exists.97 Much the same could be
true of government speech about religion. It may be that there is nothing wrong with
the particular tests used by members of the Court that accounts for their failure. It
may be impossible to find a neutral position between religion and non-religion
because no such position exists. A court decision that allows government speech
about religion favors religion; a court decision that forbids such speech favors nonreligion.98
Some scholars who defend neutrality recognize this problem, but propose, as a
baseline, that the government avoid religious speech.99 In this way, they argue, the
95
See supra Part II.A.4 (as with the case of the giant cross I posit to test the limits of the
coercion test, a prominent monument to angels may not trouble some readers. I recognize the
danger of rhetorical questions. It remains my belief, though, that most readers, like most
Supreme Court Justices, would find such a monument troubling).
96

See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (“Neither a state nor the Federal
Government . . . can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another.”).
97

See Bickers, supra note 12.

98

See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Corruption of Religion and the Establishment Clause, 50
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1831, 1842 (2009) (“If any interpretive question simply turns on a
choice between secular individualism and religious communitarianism, then in any
Establishment Clause controversy, the state is taking sides between the forces of
progressivism and religious traditionalism.”).
99

Professor Laycock’s substantive neutrality seems to require this result. See, e.g.,
Douglas Laycock, Substantive Neutrality Revisited, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 51, 72 (2007)
(arguing that monetary aid to religious schools is permitted by substantive neutrality’s
protection of individual choice, but government religious speech is not).
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government truly is able to avoid promoting either religion or non-religion.100 The
failure of this approach is that it could work in a hypothetical new country without
any history. One can certainly imagine a place of deliberate settlement, such as a
colony in space, in which the original inhabitants require their government to avoid
all mention, favorable or unfavorable, of matters of religion.
That is not the United States, however, and this avoidance solution avoids no
difficulties.101 The historical reality is that the United States was settled by peoples
who brought their religion with them102 and conducted their self-governance
accordingly. Over the centuries the American people have enacted religious mottoes
for state government units,103 erected religious monuments in public spaces,104 and
named cities after saints and divinities.105 Many of those past acts of governmental
communication remain: a requirement of avoidance, enforced seriously, would force
the courts to remove those tangible reminders of the past.106 Changing of the name
of a city or removing a monument with a backhoe is not, in the eyes of many
religious observers, neutral between religion and non-religion.107
100
The opposite view is taken by some other scholars. See, e.g., Richard M. Esenberg,
Must God Be Dead or Irrelevant: Drawing a Circle that Lets Me In, 18 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 1, 27 (2009) (“The point is not that the failure to include religious perspectives ought
to be a constitutional violation, but that doctrine that prohibits, or significantly restricts, their
inclusion will not be neutral as between them and competing secular perspectives.”).
101

Indeed, one scholar has noted that all existing monuments have social lives and
meanings, as well as legal ones, and uses that observation to argue powerfully for the
continuation of the endorsement test. See Blocher, supra note 67.
102

See, e.g., 3 FRANCIS THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATE, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR
HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 7, 3802 (1909) (The Mayflower
Compact saw the Pilgrims covenant “[i]n the Presence of God and one another,” agreement
between the Settlers at New Plymouth. Even such “secular” colonies as Virginia brought with
them the established Church of England, complete with a prohibition on the entry into the
colony of those “suspected to affect the Superstition of the Church of Rome,” until they had
sworn a loyalty oath, Second Charter of Virginia).
103
See, e.g., ACLU v. Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd., 243 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2001)
(the Establishment Clause is not violated by Ohio’s state motto, “With God, All Things Are
Possible.”).
104
See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 688-89 (2005) (listing of appearances of the Ten
Commandments and other religious representations at the Supreme Court and in other
government monuments and buildings around Washington, D.C.).
105

This practice was most common in the Spanish colonies, accounting for the large
number of “San” or “Santa” towns in the Southwest. Religious naming was not unknown in
other parts of the country, though, and there is charm in the fact that one of the preeminent
cases in Establishment Clause interpretation took place in a city called Providence. See Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1991).
106

See, e.g., Robinson v. Edmond, 68 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1995) (Edmond, Oklahoma,
required to remove Cross from one quadrant of city seal); Webb v. Republic, 55 F. Supp. 2d
994 (W.D. Mo. 1999) (Republic, Missouri, required to remove Christian fish symbol from city
seal).
107

Indeed, this may be why courts shy away from the result. Despite occasional changes to
seals, I am aware of no compelled change to the name of any political subdivision.
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2. Favoritism is Undesirable
But the situation grows worse when one examines the alternatives. If true
neutrality between religion and non-religion is impossible, favoritism of one over the
other strikes many of us as unwise,108 and possibly dangerous.109 A regime that
allows for untrammeled government religious speech begins to look a great deal
different from a tolerant pluralism. The presence of unmistakably religious imagery
in official places makes most people so uncomfortable that even most groups
proposing them do so under the color of an argument about history, philosophy, or a
non-religion specific set of community values.110 There are some Americans—there
have always been some Americans—who see this nation as a proper venue for
pronouncing their particular understanding of religious truth.111 Such individuals
remain a numerical minority, however, and must always contend against a devotion
to the separation of religion and government that traces its life back to the beginning
of our shared constitutional experience.112
If the theocratization of the United States is an unsettling image, most Americans
are equally appalled by the prospect of triumphalist non-religion. The notion that all
symbols of worship that have found their way into our public life must be removed

108

Griffin, supra note 3, at 25, “The environment now mistakenly favors religion instead of
religious liberty and fosters wars of religion instead of peaceful tolerance.”
109

One of Justice O’Connor’s final opinions in the Supreme Court expressed this concern
eloquently: “when we see around the world the violent consequences of the assumption of
religious authority by government, Americans may count themselves fortunate: Our regard for
constitutional boundaries has protected us from similar travails, while allowing private
religious exercise to flourish.” McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 882 (2005)
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
110

Part of this, no doubt, is tactical. After the issuance of the Lynch v. Donnelly opinion,
many a city or town lawyer likely advised her client by reference to the “reindeer rule,”
reading that case to allow a crèche on public land only if it is neutralized by a sufficient
number of secular symbols, such as Santa Claus and his reindeer team. Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984) (listing the display that had a crèche as also featuring Santa and
sleigh, a Christmas tree, “a clown, an elephant, and a teddy bear”). Commentators have
generally focused on the reindeer for naming this particular facet of Establishment Clause
doctrine, although there does seem to be some dispute about the number of reindeer required.
Compare Gedicks, supra note 79, at 699 (“three-reindeer rule”), with Alberto B. Lopez, Equal
Access and the Public Forum: Pinette’s Imbalance of Free Speech and Establishment, 55
BAYLOR L. REV. 167, 195 (2003) (“two plastic reindeer rule”).
111

The apotheosis may have occurred in what would otherwise be characterized as an
immigration or labor case. Holy Trinity Church v. U.S., 143 U.S. 457 (1892). In holding that
a prohibition on importing foreign workers did not apply to an Episcopal minister, Justice
David Brewer famously intoned that “no purpose of action against religion can be imputed to
any legislation, state or national, because this is a religious people.” Id. at 465. Six pages of
historical quotes about the importance of religion in American government later, Justice
Brewer declared more specifically that “this is a Christian nation.” Id. at 471.
112
See LAMBERT, supra note 92, at 238-39 (discussing the famous Article 11 of the Treaty
with Tripoli of 1797, which declared that the U.S. government was “not in any sense founded
on the Christian Religion”).
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might well lead to a severe backlash.113 We are a nation with two national holidays
that speak to religion, one specifically (Christmas) and the other generically
(Thanksgiving). We are a nation that still does little governmental business on the
day of the week sacred to Christians (Sunday).114 Indeed, although retail activities
flourish on Sundays in ways they once did not, there are still whole industries such
as banking in which it is virtually impossible to conduct business on that day.115 Our
communities and parks abound with statuary that has an at least oblique reference to
religion. The notion of all of it being changed—the statues removed, the work
schedules altered, Christmas cancelled—is a bugbear hauled out by some advocacy
groups to make rhetorical points or raise funds.116 That such changes are, to those
not engaged in such advocacy, inconceivable only highlights the problem for
constitutional law. Indeed, skeptics on the Court have occasionally accused their
colleagues of dodging the hard conclusions of their tests, for example by not using
Lemon or by finding a ceremonial deism exception, simply to avoid facing the
popular wrath that widespread adoption of non-religion might trigger.117 They may
be right; even if they are not, there must be a better way for the Constitution to
contend with this problem.
Avoidance of hard conclusions seems to be the primary distinguisher among the
various tests used by the Court. The Lemon test and its endorsement gloss are
ignored at times because they prohibit things the Court seems to wish to protect,
such as legislative opening prayers118 or a Ten Commandments monument.119 The
tests proposed as alternates, in turn, are not used consistently because they would

113

McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 893 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Supreme
Court does not apply a neutrality standard faithfully in Establishment Clause cases because it
could not do so “without losing all that sustains it: the willingness of the people to accept its
interpretation of the Constitution as definitive, in preference to the contrary interpretation of
the democratically elected branches.”).
114

See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 5546 (1998), authorizing premium pay (25% above normal rates)
for any federal employee required to work on Sunday, except those in other countries where a
different day is designated as “the day of rest and worship.”
115
Although few jurisdictions prohibit much other than alcohol sales on Sundays any more,
standing Supreme Court precedents hold that such “blue laws” do not violate the
Establishment Clause. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). See also Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
116
“We live in a culture increasingly hostile to Christians and their faith. America has
become a nation where public school students are prohibited from praying, acknowledging
their dependence upon God, and forming religious clubs, where schools and communities are
challenged from displaying nativity scenes, the Ten Commandments, and other symbols of
our religious and moral heritage.” Defending the Religious Freedom of Christians, THOMAS
MORE LAW CENTER, http://www.thomasmore.org/qry/page.taf?id=38 (last visited April 17,
2012).
117

McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 890 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“the Court has not had the
courage (or the foolhardiness) to apply the neutrality principle consistently.”).
118

See supra Part II.A.2.

119

Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
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allow things that the Court seeks to prohibit, such as mandatory school prayer120 or
the display of a crèche on a courthouse staircase.121
This dichotomy actually suggests hope. For if there is some divinable distinction
between the times the Court backs away from the tests that are too harsh and the
tests that are too yielding, we may be able to locate a principle that is just right.
Before we can find that principle, we must turn next to the very odd procedural
aspect of Establishment Clause challenges.
III. “THE ORDINARY PROCEEDINGS OF JUSTICE”:122 THE INCONSISTENCY OF
CURRENT STANDING DOCTRINE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
A. The Usual Limit of Standing
It is a commonplace to observe that the government must be neutral in religious
matters. As we have seen, for government religious speech, this uncontroversial
statement is also problematic. Likewise, it is a commonplace to note that a plaintiff
seeking to change some government action must have standing to sue.123 The
Constitution has long been read to incorporate such a requirement in Article III.124
This idea is unsurprising. Requiring trial participants to have a stake in the outcome
seems fundamental to the traditional role of the common-law court.125
In the modern era, though, this requirement has moved from a common-sense
remark about how courts work to a Great Truth, a holy relic fundamental to our very
Constitution.126 The Constitution nowhere contains the word “standing.” The
120
The history test would arguably permit such prayers. See Brief for Respondents at 11,
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (No. 468), 1962 WL 115798 at *11 (justifying the
Regents’ Prayer on the basis of “the history and growth of the United States”).
121

Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 664 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (the crèche does not coerce anyone because those who
disagree with the messages of religious symbols are “free to ignore them, or even to turn their
backs”).
122

WESTPHALIA, supra note 1, at art. CXXIII.

123

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (“When the suit is one
challenging the legality of government action or inaction, the nature and extent of facts that
must be averred (at the summary judgment stage) or proved (at the trial stage) in order to
establish standing depends considerably upon whether the plaintiff is himself an object of the
action (or forgone action) at issue.”). The test for standing—that a plaintiff have suffered an
injury, traceable to the defendant’s conduct, and redressable by the court—has been aptly
labeled “trivially easy to state but notoriously hard to apply.” Richard Murphy, Abandoning
Standing: Trading a Rule of Access for a Rule of Deference, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 943, 952
(2008).
124
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (“One of those landmarks, setting apart the “Cases” and
“Controversies” that are of the justiciable sort referred to in Article III-”serv[ing] to identify
those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process,”-is the doctrine
of standing”) (citation omitted).
125
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492 (2009). But cf. Cass Sunstein, What’s
Standing after Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 17273 (1992) (arguing that the modern standing test is “a historical blunder”).
126
One commentator has identified a persistent problem in the area being the lack of a
consistent purpose. A group of justices (and hence, some opinions) take the purpose of the
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requirement derives from the Article III definition of the jurisdiction of federal
courts as “extending . . . [to] Cases . . . [and] Controversies.”127
The Cases and Controversies requirement might only mark part of the
jurisdiction of federal courts, and not create a constitutional barrier to those courts.
At least one Framer, of considerable fame, seemed to believe that this was so.128
Nonetheless, the Cases and Controversies clause has become, over the centuries, a
requirement that a suitor in court must have an “actual case”129 to give him or her
standing to sue. This standing requirement has in turn come to include, as a
constitutional matter, the need for the plaintiff to show an “injury-in-fact,”130 and
perhaps even a “wallet injury.”131
While there are certainly cases involving the Establishment Clause that present
themselves as very ordinary for standing purposes, in many cases it has been quite
difficult to figure out exactly what “injury-in-fact” exists. The government’s
decision to give money to “someone else,” but not to “me,” certainly seems like a
“wallet injury.”132 The government’s decision to have prayer in public schools,
however, or position a crèche inside a courthouse,133 seems not to take any
recognizable amount of anyone’s money. To opine about the meaning of the
Establishment Clause in these cases, the courts must first allow some plaintiff to sue.
standing doctrine to be the separation of powers. Murphy, supra note 123, at 946. Another
group (and hence, other opinions) believe that standing guarantees sharply adversarial
proceedings by allowing into court only the right plaintiff. Id. at 947. Depending on which
view one takes will go a long way toward determining one’s feelings about cases such as
Flast, discussed infra Part III.B.
127

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559-60.

128

As President, George Washington famously sent the Supreme Court a request for advice
on a series of issues in international law. Chief Justice John Jay politely rebuffed the father of
the country, arguing that because the three branches were “in certain respects checks upon
each other,” the judiciary could not offer opinions outside of the Case or Controversy
requirement. William E. Wiecek, The Debut of Modern Constitutional Procedure, 26 REV.
LITIG. 641, 648 (2007). Jay’s answer to the question—or refusal to answer the question—has
received significant attention. See, e.g., U.S. v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 728, n. 17 (1985)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Oddly, less attention is usually given to the fact that Washington
asked for the advice, indicating his belief that answering it would not be improper for the
Court.
129

Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976).

130

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.

131

Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 619 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
132
Such cases pose their own standing limitations, however. See Ariz. Christian Sch.
Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011), discussed infra notes 176-179 and
accompanying text.
133

Frequently such items were gifts from private organizations. See e.g., Cnty. of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 587 (1989) (menorah displayed at City-County building
was owned by private Jewish group). Even where government bodies spent money on them,
the amounts were usually de minimis. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984)
(crèche initially cost less than $1,500, no maintenance funds were spent on it for a decade, and
the cost to set it up and take it down each Christmas was about $20).
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As Professors Lupu and Tuttle have observed, “[i]t is unimaginable that courts
would adjudicate claims of psychological injury by observers of other constitutional
wrongs, such as cruel punishments or patently unfair trials.”134 Yet courts in
religious challenges have done precisely that.135 The Supreme Court has done so in
the Establishment Clause area in two ways: a carefully built exception in the doctrine
for one type of case, and a studious looking-away for another.
B. Paying Taxes and Flast
The doctrinal exception allowing standing in Establishment Clause cases was
explained by the Supreme Court in Flast v. Cohen.136 There, the Court announced a
quite surprising principle. The Court said that a plaintiff would have standing when
challenging “allegedly unconstitutional federal taxing and spending programs.”137
This principal is not interesting because it is conceptually unsound: indeed, it is
possible to imagine a system of ordered (if arguably unwieldy) liberty in which all
taxpayers have the right to hale the government into court to make it demonstrate the
constitutionality of its expenditures.138
That, however, has not been the experience of the United States. In a series of
cases, beginning with Frothingham v. Mellon in 1923, the Supreme Court has taken
the position that status as a taxpayer is simply not enough to convey standing.139
That a taxpayer alleges some wrongfulness in a government appropriation, which
she or he is coerced to pay for in small part, is not enough.140 The Court rejects such

134
Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Ball on a Needle: Hein v. Freedom From Religion
Foundation, Inc. and the Future of Establishment Clause Adjudication, 2008 B.Y.U. L. REV.
115, 119 (2008).
135

“Establishment Clause standing doctrines are looser than most, for the prudential reason
that the Clause would not be judicially enforced if traditional Article III rules applied.” Id.
136

Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).

137

Id. at 101.

138

Indeed, many other nations are far less stringent in blocking access to their courts. The
German Constitution allows a Land (State) government to seek an opinion whether a federal
law in an area of concurrent federal-state authority is no longer necessary, GRUNDGESETZ FÜR
DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949,
BGBI I at art. 93(2) (Ger.). Similarly, the Indian Constitution provides explicitly for the
President to seek the advice of the Supreme Court when it is “expedient,” INDIA CONST. art.
143. More significantly, the Indian courts have expanded access to the courts by developing
the concept of “citizen standing,” which allows any citizen to sue to enforce duties owed to
them by the government because of their citizenship, without a more specific showing of
injury. See Michael G. Faure & A.V. Raja, Effectiveness of Environmental Public Interest
Litigation in India: Determining the Key Variables, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 239, 249
(2010).
139

Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (taxpayer had no standing to contest the
constitutionality of the Maternity Act, spending federal money to reduce the mortality of
mothers and infants).
140

For the Frothingham Court, this was in part a function of the separation of powers.

Looking through forms of words to the substance of their complaint, it is merely that
officials of the executive department of the government are executing and will execute
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suits with regularity, often while remarking that “the alleged injury is not ‘concrete
and particularized,’ but instead a grievance the taxpayer ‘suffers in some indefinite
way in common with people generally,’”141 or “[t]his is surely the kind of a
generalized grievance described in both Frothingham and Flast since the impact on
him is plainly undifferentiated and ‘common to all members of the public.’”142
As noted above, Flast specifically allowed just such a common grievance to be
brought to the Court.143 Why, then, should the Establishment Clause be different?
This puzzle was not really solved by Flast, which simply remarked that “the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment does specifically limit the taxing and
spending power conferred by Art. I.”144 The Court noted the history of the fear of
government support of particular sects,145 but it also referred to the problem that
would be caused if taxpayers had no standing to challenge such spending: “[t]he
logic of the Government’s argument would compel it to concede that a taxpayer
would lack standing even if Congress engaged in such palpably unconstitutional
conduct as providing funds for the construction of churches for particular sects.”146
But the former argument, that the Constitution limits the spending powers of
Congress, is true of all of the powers of Congress. There is no textual reason for
treating the Establishment Clause as a limit on federal spending sufficient to grant
standing when other guarantees such as the Free Speech Clause, the Search and
Seizure Clause, and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause are not. The second
argument is, on reflection, even more jarring. It is true that if taxpayers cannot
challenge spending for church-building then no one can. It is equally true that such
absence of remedy has simply not availed plaintiffs in other areas.147 Those

an act of Congress asserted to be unconstitutional; and this we are asked to prevent.
To do so would be, not to decide a judicial controversy, but to assume a position of
authority over the governmental acts of another and coequal department, an authority
which plainly we do not possess.
Id. at 488-89.
141

DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 344 (2006) (internal citations omitted).

142

U.S. v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-77 (1974).

143

The Court in Flast never identified specifically the amount of money at issue from the
provision of federal funds through the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. See
generally, Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). As the Act allowed the federal Commissioner
of Education to make grants to the States for assistance to low-income families, which the
States could make available for use in both public and private schools, it is difficult to imagine
that any particular taxpayer had a significant amount of “wallet injury” from the act. See Id. at
85-87.
144

Id. at 105.

145

Id. at 103 (“Our history vividly illustrates that one of the specific evils feared by those
who drafted the Establishment Clause and fought for its adoption was that the taxing and
spending power would be used to favor one religion over another or to support religion in
general.”).
146

Id. at 98 n. 17.

147

The observation of the Court on this point when rejecting a request by a taxpayer for an
accounting of the expenditures of the Central Intelligence Agency merits consideration in full:
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disappointed with the lack of judicial intervention are simply told to take their
dispute to the political arenas.148
Conceptually, the injuries to plaintiffs such as Florence Flast, who sought to stop
federal spending on textbooks for religious schools,149 are not obvious. If the injury
is conceived as a Wallet Injury—the government improperly taking money—it is
difficult to see how she suffered differently from Harriet Frothingham, who sought
to stop federal spending to reduce mortality among mothers and children.150 Money,
albeit in a vanishingly small amount, was unquestionably taken from both taxpayers
for spending on programs they believed violated the Constitution.151 The Court’s
proclamation in Flast that standing does not exist when the plaintiff challenges
merely “an incidental expenditure of funds in the administration of an essentially
regulatory statute” is an ipse dixit.152 The Court announced that specific prohibitions
of the Bill of Rights are limits to Congress different from a lack of authority under
Article I, despite the textual evidence of the Tenth Amendment seeming to make the
opposite point.153
It can be argued that if respondent is not permitted to litigate this issue, no one can do
so. In a very real sense, the absence of any particular individual or class to litigate
these claims gives support to the argument that the subject matter is committed to the
surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political process. Any other
conclusion would mean that the Founding Fathers intended to set up something in the
nature of an Athenian democracy or a New England town meeting to oversee the
conduct of the National Government by means of lawsuits in federal courts. The
Constitution created a representative Government with the representatives directly
responsible to their constituents at stated periods of two, four, and six years; that the
Constitution does not afford a judicial remedy does not, of course, completely disable
the citizen who is not satisfied with the ‘ground rules’ established by the Congress for
reporting expenditures of the Executive Branch. Lack of standing within the narrow
confines of Art. III jurisdiction does not impair the right to assert his views in the
political forum or at the polls. Slow, cumbersome, and unresponsive though the
traditional electoral process may be thought at times, our system provides for
changing members of the political branches when dissatisfied citizens convince a
sufficient number of their fellow electors that elected representatives are delinquent in
performing duties committed to them.
U.S. v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974).
148

See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221 (1974)
(hereinafter Reservists Committee) ( “The legislative function is inherently general rather than
particular and is not intended to be responsive to adversaries asserting specific claims or
interests peculiar to themselves.”).
149

Flast, 392 U.S. at 85.

150

Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 479 (1923).

151

This did not go unnoticed at the time: “how can it be said that Mrs. Frothingham’s
interests in her suit were, as a consequence of her choice of a constitutional claim, necessarily
less intense than those, for example, of the present appellants?” Flast, 392 U.S. at 124
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
152

Justice Harlan noted the “formidable obscurity of the Court’s categories.” Id.

153

“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST., amend.
X. The Flast Court, in characterizing Mrs. Frothingham’s complaint as “attempting to assert
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If, on the other hand, the injury to Ms. Flast is what Justice Scalia has called
Psychic Injury,154 it is difficult to see why the Establishment Clause should be an
area so different from the rest of the Constitution that it allows for such suits. The
Court has sometimes allowed cases to go forward in this area using something that
looks much like Psychic Injury: it is difficult to find a non-psychic injury from
merely seeing a government religious display.155
The dissonance between the Establishment Clause and everything else in
standing doctrine has not gone unnoticed in the Court. This is especially true of
those who seek a less aggressive use of the Establishment Clause, particularly in the
area of government religious speech. Over the years the Flast doctrine—which at its
announcement might have been quite expansive156—was limited in significant
ways.157
In 2007, a divided Court offered a further twist to the standing doctrine in future
Establishment Clause cases that further reduced the scope of Flast.158 In considering
the challenge by a group named Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc.159 to the
President’s Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives,160 the justices were
faced squarely with the possible elimination of the Flast incongruity. Freedom from
Religion Foundation (FRF) contended that the president and other executive branch
officers made speeches using “religious imagery” and that this violated the
the State’s interest in their legislative prerogatives,” 392 U.S. at 105, simply elided over the
fact that the Amendment recognizes the retention of power in people as well as states.
154

Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 619 (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment).
155
See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 694 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The only injury
to him is that he takes offense at seeing the monument as he passes it on his way to the Texas
Supreme Court Library.”).
156

The test in Flast had required that the plaintiff allege that “his tax money is being
extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections,” Flast, 392 U.S. at 106,
not merely the Establishment Clause.
157

The most severe early limit was probably the confident pronouncement in 1982 that the
plaintiffs challenging the transfer of real property worth one-half million dollars to an
Assembly of God college lacked standing because the transfer “was not an exercise of
authority conferred by the Taxing and Spending Clause of Art. I, § 8 . . . [but rather] . . . an
evident exercise of Congress’ power under the Property Clause.” Valley Forge Christian Coll.
v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 480 (1982).
158

Hein, 551 U.S. at 587.

159
As their name indicates, Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. is a group which
seeks to reduce the presence of religion in the public square. Among their judicial campaigns
have been struggles against prayer rooms in the Illinois State Capitol, see Van Zandt v.
Thompson, 839 F.2d 1213, 1220 (7th Cir. 1988); a statue of Jesus Christ in a public park, see
FRF v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 489 (7th Cir. 2000); and a crèche atop the roof of a
city hall, see FRF v. City of Green Bay, 581 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1022 (E.D. Wis. 2008).
160
The President created the office by Executive Order, charging it with the responsibility
“to establish policies, priorities, and objectives for the Federal Government’s comprehensive
effort to enlist, equip, enable, empower, and expand the work of faith-based and other
community organizations to the extent permitted by law.” Exec. Order No. 13199, 3 C.F.R. §
752 (2001).
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Establishment Clause.161 The Office responded, and the District Court agreed, that
FRF did not have standing to raise the claim.162 The Seventh Circuit reversed, and
the Supreme Court granted certiorari.163
FRF lost. This was unsurprising: a decision in their favor would have been
extraordinarily activist for the Court, asserting a right to enter into the meetings held
by officers of the executive branch, and to prohibit them from talking to religious
groups or about matters of faith.164 Such a result never seemed terribly likely.165
The way in which FRF lost, though, was noteworthy. The Court held that they
lacked standing to sue. Justice Alito’s plurality opinion, although recognizing the
similarity to the Flast exception, chose to “decline this invitation to extend its
holding to encompass discretionary Executive Branch expenditures.”166 The
plurality simply characterized spending by the executive as different, for the purpose
of the Establishment Clause, from spending by the legislature.
This distinction was lost on the other justices. The dissenters objected, noting
that it is the plaintiff who ought to be the focus of the inquiry into injury.167 They
rejected the characterization that FRF sought an “extension” of Flast.168 They noted
that the separation of powers concerns that the plurality marshaled on behalf of the
executive should have been precisely the same as those afforded the legislature.169
Defying Justice Alito’s own portrayal of the claim of FRF as an extreme case, they
set loose their own contrary parade of horribles, including the building of a chapel by
the Department of Health and Human Services.170
If the dissenters were unconvinced by the plurality’s executive-legislative
distinction for Flast, though, it was Justice Scalia’s concurrence in the result that
most vividly captured dissatisfaction with this characterization. His opinion attacked
the distinction between the sources of funding as having “no mooring in our
tripartite test for Article III standing.”171 His proposed solution to what he viewed as

161

Hein, 551 U.S. at 592.

162

Id. at 596.

163

Id.

164

Id. at 611 (noting separation-of-powers concern).

165

Some constitutional adjudication includes the marshaling of a “parade of horribles” to
demonstrate the limits of the doctrine at issue. In this case, however, the plurality noted that
the parade was already included in the plaintiff’s challenge itself, id. at 611 (amended
complaint included the content of Presidential speeches as well as the public appearances of
other officials).
166

Hein, 551 U.S. at 609.

167

“Here, there is no dispute that taxpayer money in identifiable amounts is funding
conferences, and these are alleged to have the purpose of promoting religion.” Id. at 639
(Souter, J., dissenting).
168

Id.

169

Id.

170

Id. at 640.

171

Id. at 630 (Scalia, J., concurring ).
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a “meaningless and disingenuous distinction,”172 was the opposite of that taken by
the dissent. For Justice Scalia, the logical approach was to recognize that Flast had
never made sense as a species of Wallet Injury, but was actually an example of the
otherwise-prohibited category of Psychic Injury.173 For him,174 the solution was
overturning Flast once and for all, but the plurality was “beating Flast to a pulp and
then sending it out to the lower courts weakened, denigrated, more incomprehensible
than ever, and yet somehow technically alive.”175
Justice Scalia’s characterization accurately depicted the state of the law. After
Hein, Flast remained a viable precedent; it just offered little help to most plaintiffs.
The Court took up the issue yet again in 2011. This time the Court considered
whether state taxpayers had standing to challenge the provision of dollar for dollar
tax credits awarded by the state in return for contributions to School Tuition
Organizations,176 many of which allegedly used the money received to offer private
school scholarships in religiously discriminatory ways.177 The Court found that the
Flast exception was “inapplicable,”178 because of the “distinction between
governmental expenditures and tax credits.”179
C. Looking Away and the Lower Courts
In Establishment Clause challenges, Flast’s carved-out exception for taxpayers is
not even the most startling anomaly. In cases challenging religious displays, the
Court has sometimes allowed to pass without comment challenges that seem based
on a truly insignificant interest. For example, when residents of Pawtucket, Rhode
Island, joined by their local American Civil Liberties Union chapter, challenged the
inclusion of a crèche in a seasonal public display, the Court never considered
standing at all.180 The Court moved directly to the purpose of the Establishment
Clause,181 and the word “standing” appears in the opinion only three times, and never
as a requirement of justiciability.182 Interestingly, the District Court had dispensed
with the requirement of standing by noting that “[e]ven before Flast v. Cohen
recognized the standing of federal taxpayers to challenge governmental expenditures
on establishment clause grounds, municipal taxpayer standing had been permitted in

172

Id. at 633.

173

Id. at 623.

174

And Justice Thomas, who joined his opinion. Id.

175

Id. at 636.

176

Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1440 (2011).

177

Id. at 1450 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

178

Id. at 1448.

179

Id. at 1447. Once again, Justice Scalia took the time to note separately that Flast
remains for him a “misguided decision,” id. at 1450 (Scalia, J., concurring).
180

Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984).

181

Id. at 671.

182

Id. at 687 (“a person’s standing in the political community”), at 695 (“a crèche standing
alone”), and at 706 (“people standing at the two bus shelters”).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol60/iss2/5

26

2012]

STANDING ON HOLY GROUND

441

this area.”183 Thus there was for the trial court “little doubt”184 that the plaintiffs had
alleged a sufficient injury despite the fact that the uncontroverted testimony was that
the city had bought the crèche eight years earlier for less than $1,400, and spent less
than $40 each year on maintenance and supplies.185
In more recent cases, the Court has seemingly gone even farther afield, allowing
cases to proceed to the merits on the basis of what appears to be no more than devout
interest. When Texas lawyer Thomas Van Orden challenged the placement of a Ten
Commandments monument by the state Capitol in Austin, the plurality rejected his
challenge substantively without pausing to inquire into his right to bring it.186
Remarkably, the District Court had gone even farther to allow the suit than the court
in Lynch, finding it appropriate to proceed to the merits “[i]n light of the very liberal
interpretation which the courts have given to the concept of standing in
Establishment Clause cases.”187 This is decidedly unusual: it has long been
axiomatic that being particularly concerned about the action of government simply
will not convey standing.188
The recent battle over a cross in the desert189 offered the Supreme Court the
opportunity to clarify the standing doctrine. The Court declined to do so.
Buono was an unusual case. In a nutshell, a group of World War I veterans had
erected a wooden cross on a stone called Sunset Rock, in a part of the Mojave Desert
that is owned by the Federal Preserve.190 These veterans had fought and survived the
War to End All Wars; they asked no one’s permission. To explain the memorial
nature of the cross, they added wooden signs that said “The Cross, Erected in
Memory of the Dead of All Wars,” and “Erected 1934 by Members of Veterans of
Fore[ig]n Wars, Death Valley post 2884.”191

183

Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1162 (D.R.I. 1981) (citation omitted).

184

Id.

185

Id. at 1156.

186

Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 695 (2005). One Justice did note that “[t]he only
injury to him is that he takes offense at seeing the monument as he passes it on his way to the
Texas Supreme Court Library,” id. at 694 (Thomas, J., concurring), but the conclusions he
drew from that observation concerned the substance of the Establishment Clause, not
justiciability.
187

Van Orden v. Perry, 2002 WL 32737462, 2 (W.D. Tex. 2002).

188

See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972) (“a mere ‘interest in a
problem,’ no matter how longstanding the interest and no matter how qualified the
organization is in evaluating the problem, is not sufficient by itself”). Judge Posner has
offered a colorful example of the issue, see DePuy, Inc. v. Zimmer Holdings, Inc., 384 F.
Supp. 2d 1237, 1240 (N.D. Ill. 2005). See also Aurora Loan Servs. v. Craddieth, 442 F.3d
1018, 1025 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating “there is a sense in which I am ‘injured’ when I become
upset by reading about the damage caused that fine old vineyard in Burgundy by a band of
marauding teetotalers, yet that injury would not be an injury that conferred standing to sue
under Article III”).
189

Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1805 (2010).

190

Id. at 1811.

191

Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d. 758, 760 (9th Cir. 2008).
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Years went by, and the harsh desert climate had the predictable erosive effect on
the humble cross. It disappeared into the mists of time, although later characters in
the story—perhaps interested in preserving the memory of World War I, and perhaps
not—replaced the cross periodically.192 Apparently, they did not replace the signs.193
By the time the case drew near to the Supreme Court, the cross at issue was one that
had been erected in 1998, was made of metal pipes painted white, was between five
and eight feet tall, and had no explanatory signs.194 It was about eleven miles from
the nearest interstate highway, and was visible for about one hundred yards of
driving on Cima Road, a narrow blacktop road that traveled through the federal
preserve.195
The case came to the Supreme Court in a way that illustrates a broader theme in
religious display cases. The 1934 veterans with their simple symbol in an out-ofthe-way place do not seem to have been seeking warfare. The same could not be
said for the forces which began contending at the site at the end of the twentieth
century. By then, the cross had attracted a fervent supporter in Henry Sandoz, a
local resident. At his own expense, he replaced the old rugged cross with the latest
thing in metalwork. In place of the humble wooden symbol pinned into a natural
crevice, he erected a cross made of painted metal pipe, ensuring its security by
drilling holes for support brackets into the face of Sunset Rock.196
At the same time, the cross gained its first recorded foes. A retired National Park
Service employee, writing under an alias, asked the Park Service for permission to
erect a Buddhist stupa on a nearby spot of land.197
The next chapter in the story might have been the most predictable. Faced with a
request for equal treatment with a monument that it did not seem to know much
about,198 the government might have acted in a pluralistic way, allowing minority as
well as majority faiths to use this otherwise idle bit of federal land. Alternatively,
the Executive Branch could endeavor to exclude all expressions of faith from this
tiny spot. Unsurprisingly, the Park Service chose the latter course, informing Mr.
Buono that the stupa could not be built and announcing plans to remove the cross.199
Then Congress got involved.200
192

Id.

193

Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1205 (C.D. Cal. 2002).

194

Id.

195

Id.

196

Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d at 1072.

197

The former employee, Harold Hoops, identified himself in the letter as “Sherpa San
Harold Horpa.” Buono, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1206.
198
The Park Service responded to the “Sherpa San Harold Horpa” letter by announcing its
intention to remove the cross. When the American Civil Liberties Union sent what might be
called a warning letter threatening suit if the cross were not removed, the Superintendent for
Ecosystem Management ordered an investigation into the history of the cross. Id. This
investigation concluded that the cross was not sufficiently historical for protection in the
Register of Historic Places. Id.
199

Id.

200

Id.
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In the version of constitutional governance often taught in American schools,
there is a carefully honed balance among the branches. Congress, in this view, acts
as the voice of the people, taking legislative steps upon considered deliberation. In
reality, of course, members of Congress, having to run for reelection consistently,
make many decisions to placate particular lobbies, interest groups, and voting
blocks.
So it was with the Sunrise Rock Cross. It quickly became a cause célèbre among
certain sections of the Christian community (largely, although not exclusively,
Evangelicals). Local residents rejected requests from the Park Service to remove the
cross voluntarily.201 Some of them lobbied Congress, and found an eager supporter
in Representative Jerry Lewis.202 He added an amendment to the December 2000
Consolidated Appropriations Act, forbidding any use of federal funds for the
removal of the cross.203 The following year Congress acted again, this time
designating the cross as an official World War I memorial and authorizing funds for
the installation of a new plaque.204
Thwarted now by both the Executive Branch—which would not allow the
symbol of a minority faith to be placed on public land—and the Legislative
Branch—which would not allow the symbol of the majority faith to be removed—
opponents of the cross turned to the Judicial Branch. So began the Jarndyce-like
course of litigation205 involving a few feet of pipe in a desert, an exercise in legal
battles that went on for years before reaching the U.S. Supreme Court.
The District Court found that the presence of the cross on federal land “conveys a
message of endorsement of religion.”206 While the appeal was underway,207
Congress again stepped in, this time requiring that the land in question be transferred
to the Barstow post of the Veterans of Foreign Wars.208 Congress required the new
owners to maintain the property as a war memorial, or it would revert to the
ownership of the United States.209

201

Id. at 1205-06.

202

Id.

203

Id. at 1206.

204

Id. at 1206-07.

205

“Jarndyce v. Jarndyce” is the seemingly endless case in the Court of Chancery invented
by Charles Dickens in BLEAK HOUSE, referred to by Chief Justice Roberts in Stern v.
Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2600 (2011).
206

Buono, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1217.

207

The Ninth Circuit upheld the District Court. Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543 (9th Cir.
2004).
208
Pub. Law No. 108-87 § 8121 (2003). In return for the one acre on which the cross
stood, the U.S. would receive a five-acre parcel of land from Mr. and Mrs. Henry Sandoz,
who had erected the cross at issue.
209

Id. This part of the legislation appears to reflect congressional understanding of the
contours of the Establishment Clause. Surely it is an odd choice otherwise to privatize a
national monument, and demand its return if the private owner ever puts it to a non-memorial
use.
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The litigation resumed. Pointing to several Ninth Circuit cases in which such
land “transfers” were held to be invalid attempts to Establishment Clause
violations,210 the plaintiffs went back to the District Court asking for the transfer to
be enjoined.211 The District Court agreed with the plaintiffs and enjoined the
transfer, and the Circuit Court again affirmed.212
The battle now seemed to be perfectly joined for a resolution of the standing
issue.213 Buono had surely not suffered any Wallet Injury, and any recognition of an
“injury-in-fact” would require a recognition that Psychic Injury sufficed to grant
standing, at least in Establishment Clause cases.214 Indeed, because any argument
that traffic patterns required one to pass near the monument would be specious, the
primary injury for the plaintiffs seemed to be that they knew the cross was out there
in the desert.215 It seemed possible that the Court would find that, like FRF, they
simply had no standing to challenge this particular government action.216

210

See, e.g., Paulson v. City of San Diego, 294 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2002).

211

Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2005).

212

Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2007). Even this discussion has been an
oversimplification of what Justice Kennedy termed a four stage process for the litigation. See
Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1812 (2010).
213

An effort more than a decade earlier had failed. When the Court declined to hear a case
involving the official city seal of Edmond, Oklahoma, three justices had dissented from the
denial of certiorari, quoting language from Valley Forge noting that the plaintiffs “fail to
identify any personal injury . . . other than the psychological consequence presumably
produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees.” Edmond v. Robinson, 517
U.S. 1201, 1202 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). As noted supra note 157, Valley Forge
was a case finding that property transfers did not fall within the Flast exception for
expenditures of money. Nonetheless this language raises the dramatic tension between what
the Flast-limiting cases have said about standing and the treatment of standing in cases
involving government speech.
214

Noting the lack of discussion of the issue at the Supreme Court, many lower courts had
applied just such a standard. As one appellate judge wrote, “the Supreme Court’s consistent
adjudication of religious display . . . cases over a span of decades suggests that the Court has
thought it obvious that the plaintiffs in those matters had standing.” Newdow v. Roberts, 603
F.3d 1002, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in judgment). Judge Kavanaugh
pointed also to the remarkable fact that in the Supreme Court’s “highly controversial and
divisive” opinions in these display cases, “none of the dissenters . . . ever contended that the
plaintiffs lacked standing.” Id.
215
As discussed supra note 188 and accompanying text, being aware that there is a
violation of law is never enough. In rejecting a challenge to the Texas Governor’s
endorsement of a prayer rally, one district judge noted that “mere knowledge that Governor
Perry will participate in a prayer rally is likewise insufficient to confer standing.” Freedom
From Religion Found. v. Perry, 2011 WL 3269339 (S.D. Tex. 2011).
216

Over the course of the litigation, the White House had changed the party affiliation of
its primary occupant, but the position of the United States did not change. As one gifted
writer noted about the Obama Administration possibly having difficulties taking a position
initially advanced by the Bush Administration, “the institutional interest of the United States
in No One Ever Having Standing makes this an easy case for them,” John P. Elwood, What
Were They Thinking?, 12 GREEN BAG 429, 448 (2009).
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Anyone in hope of resolution to the standing conundrum in Buono was doomed
to disappointment. The plurality focused its inquiry on standing to sue to enforce the
original injunction. The issue of standing in the original case simply was not before
the Court.217 Several justices were displeased with this resolution of the question.
Although Justice Scalia agreed that standing to seek the original injunction (to
remove the cross) was not before the court, the relief now sought (to block the
transfer) was an expansion of the original injunction, and hence subject to a new
standing determination.218 In that analysis, Justice Scalia argued that Buono came up
short because of the nature of his pleading, “even assuming that being ‘deeply
offended’ by a religious display (and taking steps to avoid seeing it) constitutes a
cognizable injury.”219 In response, Justice Stevens argued that Buono would have
standing even if the injunction at issue were a new one, because of his claim that he
was “unable to freely use the area of the Preserve around the cross,” because he was
offended by it.220
This studied looking-away from the standing problem by the Supreme Court has
simply not helped.221 As Judge Kavanaugh noted,222 it seems extremely unlikely that
the Supreme Court simply overlooked the standing problem while deciding cases
that caused fierce conflicts inside and outside the Court.223 The problem is made
more serious by the Court’s repeated invocations of two principles that seem to point
to opposite results in this situation. On the one hand, the Court has an obligation to
inquire into standing even if neither party contests it and the lower courts never
addressed it.224 On the other, the Court frequently reminds us that we are not to draw
conclusions from their silence on jurisdictional issues. 225
It is no wonder other federal judges sometimes express frustration over the lack
of consistent guidance. As Judge Demoss noted:
217

Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1814.

218

Id. at 1825 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).

219

Id. at 1826-27 (emphasis added).

220

Id. at 1830 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

221

Not only did the doctrinal contours not improve, but the desert did not even grow more
peaceful. Less than a fortnight after the Supreme Court opinion, person or persons unknown
simply took the cross from Sunrise Rock. See Randal C. Archibold, Cross at Center of Legal
Dispute Disappears, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2010, at A15. Shortly thereafter, person or persons
unknown (probably different ones) installed another cross. Determining that was merely a
replica, the Park Service took it down. Lawsuits continue, a $125,000 reward to locate the
cross stands uncollected as of this date, and a local newspaper received an e-mail claiming
that the cross had been removed “lovingly,” because the Supreme Court decision had
“desecrated” it. Robert Barnes, If There’s No Cross, Is There Still a Case?, WASH. POST,
Aug. 23, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 16799789.
222

See discussion of Newdow v. Roberts, 603 F.3d at 1014, supra note 214.

223

See infra Part II.A.

224

FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 230-31 (1990).

225

Hagans v. Levine, 415 U.S. 528, 533 n.5 (1974) (“[W]hen questions of jurisdiction have
been passed on in prior decisions sub silentio, this Court has never considered itself bound
when a subsequent case finally brings the jurisdictional issue before us.”).
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The Supreme Court cannot continue to speak out of both sides of its
mouth if it intends to provide real guidance to federal courts on this issue.
That is, it cannot continue to hold expressly that the injury in fact
requirement is no different for Establishment Clause cases, while it
implicitly assumes standing in cases where the alleged injury, in a nonEstablishment Clause case, would not get the plaintiff into the
courthouse.226
The suggestion ultimately voiced by Judge DeMoss, that a fair reading of the
standing doctrine would bar courts from hearing complaints regarding government
religious speech or displays, is logical. It is also consistent with other standing
doctrine. If the requirement of actual injury is truly settled and truly constitutional in
nature, and if “psychic injury”227 is insufficient to qualify as a case or controversy,
the Supreme Court’s view of the merits of the questions such as the display of a
crèche matter only as an academic exercise. Indeed, following Hein to its logical
conclusion and eliminating the anomaly of Flast seems the approach most likely to
bring consistency to this messy area.228
IV. “NEITHER UNDER THE COLOUR OF RIGHT, NOR BY THE WAY OF DEED”:229 THE
CONSEQUENCES OF ELIMINATING STANDING
If it would bring consistency, however, this approach would also come at what
might be a terrible price. For one lesson of American political history old and new
stands out: if no one has standing to enforce a particular constitutional requirement
in the courts, that requirement will cease to exist as more than words on paper.
A. An Officer and a Legislator
One startling example of this phenomenon appeared in the summer of 1974.230
Military reserve personnel and veterans formed an organization to oppose the war in
Vietnam.231 Possibly because they thought they could actually get some pro-war
Congressmen removed from the military reserves, or possibly just to make trouble
for them,232 the Reservists’ Committee to Stop the War sued the Secretary of
226

Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 494 F.3d 494, 500 (5th Cir. 2007) (DeMoss, J.,
specially concurring).
227
See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 619 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment), which defines psychic injury as “the taxpayer’s mental displeasure
that money extracted from him is being spent in an unlawful manner” (emphasis in original).
Of course, the injury of such mental displeasure is even more attenuated when the taxpayer’s
money has not been spent because the monument was donated, as in Van Orden.
228

Id. at 629 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (arguing that retaining Flast as a
precedent merely continues “the disreputable disarray of our Establishment Clause standing
jurisprudence.”).
229

WESTPHALIA, supra note 1, at art. II.

230

Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).

231

Id. at 211.

232

There is a hint in the District Court opinion that part of the goal was exposure of
possible conflicts of interest through “extensive discovery into Pentagon files.” Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War v. Laird, 323 F. Supp. 833 (D.D.C. 1971) [hereinafter Laird].
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Defense. They sought to force him to dismiss the military reserve officers who were
then members of Congress.233
The constitutional provision at issue seems quite clear,234 and the Framer’s
reasons for it stemmed from the tradition of separation of powers and the concern
over the corruptibility of legislators.235 The District Court found that service as an
officer in the military reserves violated the Constitution, and issued a declaratory
judgment to that effect.236
After affirmation by the Appellate Court, however, the Supreme Court rejected
the case out of hand. It was not that the Court found the District Court’s
understanding of the Constitution or the statute governing the Reserves
unpersuasive;237 it simply never considered it at all. The plaintiffs had no standing,
said the Supreme Court, because of the “necessarily abstract nature of the injury.”238
The District Court had opined that the Committee had standing as citizens to
challenge the behavior, in part because the case involved a “precise, self-operative
provision of the Constitution.”239 It also mattered to the judge that “if these plaintiffs
cannot obtain judicial review of defendants’ action, then as a practical matter no one
can.”240
These factors failed to move the Supreme Court. Chief Justice Burger
categorized the arguable constitutional violation as “one which presents injury in the
abstract,” that would “adversely affect only the generalized interest of all citizens in
constitutional governance.”241 To the notion that exclusion of these plaintiffs meant
that no one could ever challenge the alleged violation of the Constitution, the Court
233

Reservists Comm., 418 U.S. at 211.

234

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, “no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a
Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.” This portion of the Constitution
is often referred to as the Incompatibility Clause, see Reservists Comm., 418 U.S. at 210.
235
An early version of the clause had members of Congress ineligible to serve as officers
for one year after leaving Congress; one possible reason for the removal of that bar was the
concern expressed by James Wilson that such a rule might prevent the nation from using the
services of the best military commanders during a time of crisis. See Laird, 323 F. Supp. at
835-37.
236

Id. at 842. The district court declined to issue the requested injunction ordering the
elimination of the legislators from the Reserves, finding that there was no “urgent necessity”
for such action. Id. at 843.
237

The Court certainly might have done so: although the Secretary of Defense’s argument
focused on standing, an amicus brief of The Reserve Officers Association articulated a
statutory analysis of the military reserves arguing that such positions were not officers of the
United States for constitutional purposes. Brief of the Reserve Officers Ass’n of the U.S. as
Amicus Curiae on the Merits, Richardson v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, (No. 721188), 1973 WL 172290.
238

Reservists Comm., 418 U.S. at 220.

239

Laird, 323 F. Supp. at 840.

240

Id. at 841. The district judge rejected the other grounds for standing offered by the
plaintiffs: their status as reservists, as opponents of the Vietnam War, and as taxpayers. Id. at
840.
241

Reservists Comm., 418 U.S. at 217.
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noted merely that “[o]ur system of government leaves many crucial decisions to the
political process.”242 To this date, members of Congress continue to hold
commissions as officers in the United States military reserves. The practice goes
unchallenged because virtually no one can challenge it.243
B. Appointments and Emoluments
The Constitution also prohibits the appointment of any member of Congress
“during the Time for which he was elected” to any office of the United States “which
shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased
during such time.”244
The language of the clause is direct,245 and its purpose transparent. The Framers
were concerned that the president could use his power of appointment “to corrupt or
seduce a majority” of the legislators.246 Yet on several occasions in the last hundred
years, Presidents have reached out to sitting members of Congress to appoint them to
cabinet positions for which the pay has been increased. The most recent case, the
appointment of Senator Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State,247 was resolved in the
same way as the last few: the Saxbe fix.248 The maneuver, named after William
242

Id. at 227.

243

In extraordinarily rare circumstances, a plaintiff making an Incompatibility Clause
challenge might actually have standing. Such a case involved Airman First Class Charles
Lane, who pled guilty to cocaine use in a Special Court-Martial. Such convictions are initially
reviewed by the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals, a panel of uniformed military officers
required to review cases de novo for legal and factual sufficiency. One member of Airman
Lane’s panel was Lt. Col. Lindsey Graham, who was simultaneously a Senator from South
Carolina. Airman Lane unsuccessfully challenged Sen. Graham’s assignment to the panel. In
his appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (C.A.A.F.), the civilian court which
hears appeals from the military Courts of Criminal Appeals, Airman Lane won a new review
of his conviction and sentence. The C.A.A.F. held that his personal injury gave him standing,
and agreed that service as a member of a Court of Criminal Appeals violated the principle of
separation of powers written into the Incompatibility Clause. See U.S. v. Lane, 64 M.J. 1
(2006). In rejecting the government’s argument that Lane had no standing, the court noted
that “[u]nder such a regime, the structural integrity of the Constitution would rest on a gravely
weakened foundation.” Id. at 4. Note that this precisely contradicts the U.S. v. Richardson,
418 U.S. 166 (1974) observation, see supra note 147.
244

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6. Alternatively called the Emoluments Clause or, perhaps to
distinguish it from the other emoluments reference in art. I, § 9, the Ineligibility Clause.
245

Or, more precisely, was in 1787. My colleague Richard A. Bales observes that most of
us no longer use the term “emoluments” to mean “advantage, profit, or gain received as a
result of one’s employment or one’s holding of office.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 563 (8th
ed. 2004).
246

THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 459 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

247

Because Senator Clinton had been in the Senate when the pay of the Secretary of State
had been increased, Congress passed a Joint Resolution reducing the pay for that position to
its earlier level, see Compensation and Other Emoluments Attached to the Office of Secretary
of State, S.J. Res. 46, 110th Cong. § 1(a), Pub. L. No. 110-455, 122 Stat. 5036 (2008).
248
Oddly, the first beneficiary of the “Saxbe fix” was not Saxbe, but Philander Knox sixtyfour years earlier. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is Lloyd Bentson Unconstitutional, 46 STAN.
L. REV. 907, 909 (1994).
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Saxbe, nominated to be Attorney General by President Richard Nixon following the
“Saturday Night Massacre,”249 requires Congress to pass a temporary reduction in
the pay of the particular office.250 Scholars disagree whether the Saxbe fix actually
fixes anything.251 The disputes are literally of only academic interest, however, as no
one appears to have standing to complain.252
C. One Nation Under God, by Act of Congress?
The lesson found in these cases is that Constitutional provisions for which no one
has standing to sue might as well simply not exist. The Framers’ elaborate plans to
protect the separation of powers by preventing either the appointment of legislators
to executive branch office they had created (or whose emoluments they had
“encreased”) are widely ignored. The same is true for the Framers’ careful plan to
prevent the service of officers as legislators are widely ignored. The only limit is an
electoral one: provided a Senator does not offend his or her constituency by service
in the military reserve, reelection will be possible. Provided a president does not
shock the body politic by appointment of members of Congress to executive
positions, few will care.
This may be an interesting problem of the sort that troubles constitutional
scholars253 but ultimately does not imperil the republic.254 The result of such an

249

The colorful phrase refers to the firing of Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox,
which caused a major personnel shake-up when both the Attorney General Elliot Richardson
and the Deputy Attorney General William Ruckleshaus resigned rather than following
President Nixon’s order to dismiss the Special Prosecutor. See ARCHIBALD COX, THE COURT
AND THE CONSTITUTION 23-25 (1987).
250

Id.

251

A decade and a half ago, Prof. Paulsen argued that both plain language and prior
practice indicated that the rule of the Emoluments is a rule, not a suggestion. Paulsen, supra
note 248, at 911 (“It is not sufficient to satisfy the perceived ‘spirit’ of a constitutional
provision. The letter of the law must be observed as well.”). More recently, Prof. Mark
Tushnet has agreed that “[t]he Saxbe fix seems simply fraudulent.” Mark Tushnet,
Constitutional Workarounds, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1499 (2009).
252
Paulsen, supra note 248, at 916. Prof. Paulsen noted that what he called the “Lloyd
Bentsen Relief from the Constitution Act of 1993” granted standing to anyone “aggrieved by
an action of the Secretary of the Treasury.” Id. Note, though, that the same authorization to
sue was contained in the law allowing Senator Clinton to become Secretary of State, supra
note 247, but that in the only case in which a plaintiff raised this challenge, the District Court
dismissed the suit for the familiar reason that the plaintiff, a State Department employee,
lacked standing. See Rodearmel v. Clinton, 666 F. Supp. 2d 123 (D.D.C. 2009).
253

Prof. Paulsen seemed saddened over the lack of concern about the Saxbe fix in the
appointment of Senator Bentson to be Secretary of the Treasury. Paulsen, supra note 248, at
918 (“The Constitution, apparently, is not a very important political consideration, which
doesn’t say much for our political stewardship of it.”).
254

Prof. Tushnet refers to maneuvers like the Saxbe fix as a “constitutional workaround,”
albeit a “fraudulent” one, that works because the political branches recognize that they must
do something rather than simply ignoring the constitutional language, which itself
“demonstrates a kind of fidelity to the Constitution,” Tushnet, supra note 251, at 1514.
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approach in the area of the Establishment Clause, however, is far more ominous.255
If no one were ever able to seek injunctions against government religious speech, it
seems likely that expressions of endorsement of particular religions would increase,
perhaps substantially.
Defenders of restrictive standing rules may argue that this is not a problem. The
people, such critics might say, are the ultimate guardians of their own freedom.
There is no harm in turning these fundamental problems over to the people for their
ultimate solution.256 After all, if the President was to be given a title, for example
being named the “Royal Protector” of a foreign land, and the people objected,
Congress would have a real incentive to impeach.257 If the people did not mind, that
would answer the question whether the people wished to see that provision enforced,
preferring instead to allow the President to ignore the plain language of the
Constitution.258
Such an approach does seem to call into question the desirability of having a
written Constitution at all. Even if one does not find such a political solution
troubling for some parts of the Constitution,259 there is something that feels very
disturbing about it when applied to the Establishment Clause.260 For religion carries
255

In evaluating the Flast-Hein line of cases, even before the issuance of the decision in
Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization, Prof. Manian noted that “[w]ithout such an
exception to the restriction on taxpayer standing, the right guaranteed by the Establishment
Clause would essentially have no remedy in many cases.” Maya Manian, Rights, Remedies,
and Facial Challenges, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 611, 624 (2009).
256
Indeed, Justice Scalia seems to have advocated this specifically (“[I]n the context of
public acknowledgments of God there are legitimate competing interests: On the one hand, the
interest of that minority in not feeling ‘excluded’; but on the other, the interest of the
overwhelming majority of religious believers in being able to give God thanks and
supplication as a people, and with respect to our national endeavors. Our national tradition
has resolved that conflict in favor of the majority.”). McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844,
900 (2005).
257

U.S. CONST. art. I., § 9.

258

As Prof. Murphy has noted, the end result of some views of standing doctrine is to
guarantee precisely this result. Murphy, supra note 123, at 974 (“Justice Scalia has followed
the logic of this competency argument so far as to argue that restrictive standing doctrine
improves government performance by protecting the Executive’s power to ignore the law
from officious judicial efforts to enforce it.”).
259
Many commentators find any such line-drawing with regard to the Constitution—as
opposed to standing in statutory relief cases—troubling. As Judge Berzon has written, the
Court in the mid-twentieth century seemed to believe “that the availability of some means of
enforcement is implicit in the concept of a ‘right,’ and, more broadly, perhaps implicit in the
nature of a constitution.” Hon. Marsha S. Berzon, Securing Fragile Foundations: Affirmative
Constitutional Adjudication in Federal Courts, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 685 (2009).
260
It may be this instinct that caused Professor Tushnet to declare that “working around the
thin Constitution’s provisions might be worrisome in a way that working around the thick
Constitution’s provisions is not.” Tushnet, supra note 251, at 1507 (defining the “thick
Constitution” as the organizational part of the document, and the “thin Constitution” as those
provisions that “directly reflect . . . deep commitments”). See also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note
134, at 167 (arguing that judicial deference seen in areas such as war powers would be
inappropriate to Establishment Clause questions “because minority interests are frequently at
stake”).
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with it a sense of identity, and a political solution, as noted in Carolene Products’
celebrated fourth footnote,261 only works against minority positions and minority
identities. An enlightened majority may limit its own behavior to protect others,262
but there is no political incentive for that enlightenment. Generally, majorities will
be unenlightened; they will act in their own self-interest, not from a desire to be evil,
but because they do not even realize they are doing it.263
There is no real reason to think that provisions of the Constitution that limit
majority governance are equally well served by judicial enforcement and popular
political choice.264 If the Bill of Rights is to be enforced only through political
choices, there was no reason to enfold it into our constitutional structure.265 This is
no mere hypothetical point. The history of American law—a law developed by a
people whose majority has always been Christian in self-identification—has been
one of quiet, unassuming favoritism for Christianity. Setting to one side those who
have actively sought to use the machinery of the state for religious purposes,266 the
masses of well-meaning Christians have simply reflexively written laws that closed
stores and entertainment on the Christian day of worship,267and commemorated the
celebration of the Christian savior’s birth as a national holiday.268 In none of these
acts was there a deliberate desire to harm members of minority faiths; indeed, many
who support these actions based on Christianity are astonished by the argument that

261
In outlining areas which might be subject to more searching judicial scrutiny, Justice
Stone included the possibility that religious minorities, like racial minorities, might be subject
to prejudice that would “curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon” to remove “undesirable legislation.” U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S.
144, 153 n. 4 (1938).
262

In rejecting a constitutionally-compelled exemption from general prohibitions on the
use of peyote for religious reasons, the Court noted approvingly that it was “not surprising that
a number of States have made an exception to their drug laws for sacramental peyote use.”
Employ. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
263

Dissenting from the Court’s rejection of an Air Force regulation that forbade the
wearing of a yarmulke indoors, Justice Brennan observed that the practical effect of a no
“visible dress and grooming” requirement, was to establish that “under the guise of neutrality
and evenhandedness, majority religions are favored over distinctive minority faiths.”
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 521 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
264

See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 134, at 153 (“Many religion-promoting acts by
government create no obvious material or personal injury and may be quite popular. The
political branches thus will frequently have incentives to violate the Clause.”).
265
Even a defender of restrictive standing as a means of protecting self-government has
noted that “[i]f a religious majority were to establish religion at the expense of religious
minorities through legislative action, there is little prospect of a sufficient ‘political’ remedy
for a disadvantaged religious (or even secular) minority.” Jonathon H. Adler, God, Gaia, the
Taxpayer, and the Lorax: Standing, Justiciability, and Separation of Powers After
Massachusetts and Hein, 20 REGENT U.L. REV. 175, 196 (2008).
266

See Holy Trinity Church v. U.S., 143 U.S. 457 (1892), supra note 111.
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See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), supra note 115.
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5 U.S.C. § 6103 (2012).
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are acting in a religiously discriminatory way.269 Instead, the majority simply fell
victim to the predictable assumptions that arise within every culture. It is difficult to
recognize that one’s own local experiences do not define the field of human
existence. If I am a Christian, surrounded by other Christians, I can easily, though
mistakenly, conclude that everyone celebrates Christmas, or that the cross is a
universal symbol of resting places for the dead. This is especially pronounced in an
area of human identity as sensitive as religion: members of minority faiths
sometimes take measures to avoid calling attention to that fact, so members of the
majority faith may not even realize that there are worshippers of other religions in
their midst.
But if there is no political incentive for the majority to regulate itself, and if the
minority cannot seek the aid of Courts to rectify the situation, then an America open
to religious pluralism is open only as a matter of legislative, and hence popular,
grace. If recent developments in the area of government religious speech have
shown any consistent trend, it is that this grace is noticeably diminishing in our time.
An obvious example has been the treatment by the Supreme Court of the Ten
Commandments, and the subsequent behavior of the American polity.
Since the Court held that the display of the outdoor stone monument to the
commandments was permitted, other cities and towns have seized upon this example
to erect their own monuments to this particular religious code.270 Since the Court
struck the indoor display in a courthouse using the Lemon271 formulation because of
the purpose evinced by the County, other cities and counties have had identical
indoor displays approved because they were approved in silence or with solemn
intonations of a secular purpose.272
This is all happening in a legal regime that permits the awkward and
contradictory standing rules to live, albeit in a weak and sickly form. One need not
be too cynical about human nature to fear the sort of things that might happen if the
269
During the oral argument in Salazar v. Buono, Justice Scalia asked a question
containing a presumption: “the cross is the -- is the most common symbol of -- of -- of the
resting place of the dead, and it doesn’t seem to me -- what would you have them erect? A
cross -- some conglomerate of a cross, a Star of David, and you know, a Moslem half moon
and star?” Transcript of Oral Argument at 38-39, Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010)
(No. 08-427). When counsel for the petitioner responded that “[t]he cross is the most
common symbol of the resting place of Christians. I have been in Jewish cemeteries. There is
never a cross on a tombstone of a Jew,” Justice Scalia responded that the conclusion that the
cross in question only honored Christians was “outrageous.” Id. at 39, available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-472.pdf.
270

Albeit not always successfully, see, e.g., Green v. Haskell Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 568
F.3d 784 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding unconstitutional endorsement in the erection of the
monument because of religious motivation). Ultimately the monument was relocated to an
American Legion building about a block away, see Althea Peterson, Settlement Set in Stone,
TULSA WORLD, July 28, 2010, at A13.
271

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973).

272
See, e.g., ACLU v. Grayson Cnty., 591 F.3d 837 (6th Cir. 2010). The original display
apparently went back up in McCreary County as well, albeit in a less conspicuous location.
PETER IRONS, GOD ON TRIAL: DISPATCHES FROM AMERICA’S RELIGIOUS BATTLEFIELDS 214
(2007) (quoting the county judge-executive as saying that “the people here want the
Commandments in the courthouse”).
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standing rules were made more consistent and logical. If only Wallet Injury were
sufficient to allow citizens to complain of government conduct, much government
conduct favoring majority religious practice would go unchecked.273 It is not
impossible to imagine the further ebbing of the populist grace that has marked public
religion in America. It is not impossible to imagine a popular Christianity moving
triumphantly to take possession of the public square.
V. “[A]PERPETUAL OBLIVION, AMNESTY, OR PARDON”:274 THE SOLUTION STANDING
REFORM MIGHT OFFER TO SUBSTANCE
Fortunately, America’s much-hyped “religious wars” are truly minor by
comparison with other struggles in human history,275 a mere “kerfuffle” in the words
of one federal judge.276 Just under four hundred years ago, European principalities
brought to an end a war that had been “an unprecedented catastrophe for the German
people.”277 Although The Thirty Year’s War had large political motivations,278 much
of the ferocity of the war came from the religious identity taken on by many of the
participants.279 The war was never as simple as Catholic versus Protestant, but the
slaughters conducted by groups of soldiers fighting under religious banners gave the
war much of its particular fury.280 When the time finally came that the flames of
religious and political fervor burned lower,281 the diplomats who settled down in
Westphalia to conclude a peace treaty opted for the only solution they could find to
stop fighting.282 They stopped fighting.
273
See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.175 (2011) (permitting local school districts to
“authorize the recitation of the traditional Lord’s prayer and the pledge of allegiance to the
flag in public elementary schools”).
274

Westphalia, supra note 1, at art. II.

275

Indeed, some commentators argue that they are over-hyped, and that religious conflict is
not truly a matter for worry in the United States. See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, Religion,
Division, and the First Amendment, 94 GEO. L. J. 1667, 1720 (2006) (arguing that divisions
based on religion are not a sound basis for a finding of unconstitutionality because they are no
more dangerous than political opinions that run along “racial or gender fault lines”). See also
Koppelman, supra note 98, at 1838 (“It is not clear why division along religious lines is
worse than divisions along lines of race, gender, age, ethnicity, or economic class.”).
276

Green v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 450 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1274 (E.D. Okla. 2006).

277

GEOFFREY PARKER, THE THIRTY YEARS’ WAR 215 (1984).

278

CHARLES WILSON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPE 1558-1648, at 257-58 (1976)
(describing Catholic France’s entry into the war on the side of the Protestant forces, making it
essentially a Bourbon versus Hapsburg conflict).
279

RICHARD S. DUNN, THE AGE OF RELIGIOUS WARS 1559-1715, at 86 (2d ed. 1979) (noting
Wallenstein’s forcible conversion of cities he took).
280

PARKER, supra note 277, at 125 (describing the “annihilation” of Magdeburg).

281

WILSON, supra note 278, at 262 (characterizing Europe as “bankrupt, exhausted, and
deadlocked” leading to the peace treaty).
282
Scholars have noted the wisdom of Westphalia before, but primarily to focus on the
spatial rather than the temporal nature of the Treaty. The settlement allowed princes and
rulers to determine the religion of areas under their control. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Race,
Religion, Gender, and Interstate Federalism: Some Notes from History, 16 QUINNIPIAC L.
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A. Cease and Desist as Solution
The seeming tautology is actually an observation of some value.283 The great
discovery of the diplomats gathered at Westphalia was that the wounds of the
religious conflicts both before and during The Thirty Year’s War ran extraordinarily
deep. To allow each side to bring up, and demand restitution for, old injuries would
doom the process. The very reparations and apologies would lead to further
demands, the consideration of more old grievances, and the breakdown of the peace
talks that all needed because of old injuries that all remembered.
So the diplomats hit upon the solution of simply starting with a clean slate. The
declaration of a “Universal Peace” and “perpetual, true, and sincere Amity”284 was
followed by the requirement that both sides would grant to the other “a perpetual
Oblivion, Amnesty, or Pardon of all that has been committed.”285 In other words, the
parties agreed to forgive, or forget, or both. In any event, the rule that would cover
all subsequent time was a rule of peace. The princes and their civil and military
lieutenants would “abstain for the future from all Acts of Hostility.”286 There was
also a guarantee of “the free Exercise of their Religion,”287 although this applied only
to designated Lutherans in Catholic lands. Although by no means a universal
declaration of acceptance for all forms of religion and non-religion alike, the Treaty
did guarantee those affected the right to practice their faith both in “in public[]
Churches” and “in private in their own Houses.”288
Wars in Europe, of course, did not end at Westphalia. Religious struggles in
Europe did not even end at Westphalia, but “religion no longer dominated
international relations as it once had done.”289 The Treaty offered a real start in
creating a vision for religious pluralism and tolerance, even though it was limited at
the time to particular sects of the Christian faithful.
B. Standing as a Means of Ceasefire
Is such a solution possible for America’s current struggle over government
religious speech in the public square? A revision of standing doctrine might offer
just such an answer. It could accomplish a result procedurally that one justice has
articulated substantively, in a powerful and thoughtful opinion that unfortunately
failed to garner the support of any of his colleagues.
REV. 19, 23 (1996) (arguing that the Establishment Clause “was the American equivalent of
the Peace of Augsburg of 1555, or the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, where religious warfare
in Europe was resolved by allowing the religion of the local prince to determine the religion of
the principality.”).
283

Such declarations are not unknown at the Supreme Court, see, e.g., Parents Involved in
Comm. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (“The way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”).
284

Westphalia, supra note 1, at art. I.

285

Westphalia, supra note 1, at art. II.

286

Westphalia, supra note 1, at art. CIV.

287

Westphalia, supra note 1, at art. XXVIII.

288

Id.

289

PARKER, supra note 277, at 218.
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The opinion that hoped for an end to religious strife came from the pen of Justice
Breyer in Van Orden v. Perry.290 His separate opinion in that case carried with it the
fifth vote that allowed the Fraternal Order of Eagles’ Ten Commandments
monument to remain outside the Texas state capitol in Austin.291 Eschewing the
plurality’s analysis, and specifically rejecting Justice Scalia’s announcement of a
“monotheism exception” to the Establishment Clause,292 Justice Breyer focused on a
variety of factors. Although he referred to the monument’s setting among other
(unequivocally secular) monuments,293 foremost on his mind seems to have been the
prevention of further religious struggle. He noted that “40 years passed in which the
presence of this monument, legally speaking, went unchallenged.”294 Observing that
nothing suggested that intimidation caused this period of peace, he concluded that
“the public visiting the capitol grounds has considered the religious aspect of the
tablets’ message as part of what is a broader moral and historical message reflective
of a cultural heritage.”295
Justice Breyer found that under Lemon as well as Justice O’Connor’s
observations about endorsement, with which he specifically agreed, the monument
passed constitutional muster.296 Perhaps more importantly, he expressed his concern
that
[t]o reach a contrary conclusion here, based primarily on the religious
nature of the tablets’ text would, I fear, lead the law to exhibit a hostility
toward religion that has no place in our Establishment Clause traditions.
Such a holding might well encourage disputes concerning the removal of
longstanding depictions of the Ten Commandments from public buildings
across the Nation. And it could thereby create the very kind of religiously
based divisiveness that the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid.297
His opinion announced that the primary distinctions between the Texas
Commandments, which he voted to allow, and the Kentucky Commandments, which
he voted to take down, were the purpose of the display and its effect on observers.298
Yet he also characterized as the “determinative” factor the age of the Texas
monument.299 One admittedly simplistic way to read the distinction between the two
was to view old monuments as permissible, but not new ones.

290

Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 698 (2005).

291

See id.

292

Id. at 704 n. 17.

293

Id. at 702.

294

Id.

295

Id. at 703.

296

Id. at 704.

297

Id. (citing Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 717-29 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting)).
298

Id. at 703.

299

Id. at 702.
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As a substantive matter this position is hard to defend.300 Some commentators
noted sharply that it takes an extraordinarily well-versed observer to note the
differences between an old monument and a new one.301 Indeed, other Ten
Commandments monuments have appeared in other places since Van Orden. While
most lack some of the stylistic devices of the group prepared by the Fraternal Order
of Eagles four decades ago—some even containing misspellings302—it would be
unsurprising if new arrivals in the town thought such monuments dated back to an
earlier day. A legal brief filed with the Court can say when the monument was
erected; unless there is a date on the monument itself, an observer likely will not
know.
If the old/new dichotomy makes little sense as a substantive test, though, it serves
magnificently to alleviate the procedural problem. If the Court were to recast
standing, which seems necessary in any event, that doctrine could serve the same
purpose as Justice Breyer’s test.
To create a Westphalian solution, the Court could say: one has standing to raise
an Establishment Clause challenge about a future or current act of government
religious speech, but not a past one. The injury, the Court might say, occurs when
the religious speech occurs, when the monument is erected or installed. Such
monuments do not continue to speak, the Court could hold, thus protecting older
monuments from the application of Lemon, which they might well fail. More
importantly, such a doctrine would free the Court from the current agony of simply
ignoring Lemon and substituting some other test in cases of long-ago government
speech in which a majority of the Supreme Court does not like the result that a fair
application of Lemon would bring.303
300

As Justice Scalia has noted, “the antiquity of the practice at issue . . . is hardly a good
reason for letting an unconstitutional practice continue.” McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S.
844, 892 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Others have pointed out that Justice Breyer’s
emphasis on divisiveness inherently works against minority faiths. See MARTHA NUSSBAUM,
LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 263
(2008) (“Should we really say that a display that everyone likes and that isn’t stirring up
trouble, because the offended minorities are too powerless to make trouble, is for that reason
constitutional?”). It is notable, though, that Professor Nussbaum seems to adopt a similar
old/new test when resolving the case herself. See id. at 265 (“[T]he monument has stood there
for forty-five years without controversy, so it can fairly be claimed that it has become a part of
Texas tradition. Surely removing a monument in such circumstances is a far more aggressive
judicial act than simply telling Kentucky it cannot proceed with its new program.”).
301

See, e.g., Susan Hanley Kosse, A Missed Opportunity to Abandon the Reasonable
Observer Framework in Sacred Text Cases: McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky and
Van Orden v. Perry, 4 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 139 (2006).
302

See, e.g., Green v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 450 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1277 (E.D. Okla.
2006) (the monument at issue condemned something called “adultry”).
303

Or, as one justice has argued, fears the logical result of the test:

What, then, could be the genuine “good reason” for occasionally ignoring the
neutrality principle? I suggest it is the instinct for self-preservation, and the
recognition that the Court, which “has no influence over either the sword or the
purse,” cannot go too far down the road of an enforced neutrality that contradicts both
historical fact and current practice without losing all that sustains it: the willingness of
the people to accept its interpretation of the Constitution as definitive, in preference to
the contrary interpretation of the democratically elected branches.
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VI. WESTPHALIAN AMERICA
There would still be litigation under such an approach, but it would offer more
clarity than what is currently available. An analysis of the expected outcomes of a
few possible cases will illustrate what such a regime might look like.
Consider first our example earlier of a proposed giant cross on the national
mall.304 As a new monument, the cross is a change to the status quo. Because it is a
change, anyone who personally disapproved would have standing to challenge the
installation. There would be no need to navigate the contortions of finding an injury,
no requirement that any person show that he or she had to use the mall for some
reason, but was deprived of access by the oppressive effects of the cross. The fact of
newness, the very creation of the monument, would suffice to allow a federal court
to entertain the case. The court could then proceed to the substantive test for
Establishment Clause violation. In this case, Lemon would seem to suffice. It is
difficult to find a purpose other than a religious one in the creation of a giant,
sectarian monument. Additionally, it is implausible that such a monument would not
advance Christianity. Indeed, it is possible that the selection of the style of cross
itself, from options as diverse as the Greek, Latin, or Russian crosses, could be
evidence of excessive entanglement.
On the other hand, assume a challenge to the portrait of Moses carrying the Ten
Commandments on the frieze inside the Supreme Court.305 Under the current model
of thinking, a court would first have to be convinced that some person suffered some
injury from this particular bit of artwork. Having so concluded, it would then
predictably go on to apply a historical exception analysis, or a coercion test, or a
mere ceremonial deism rubric. Under a Westphalian analysis, none of this would be
necessary. The court could examine the age of the frieze, and dismiss the plaintiff
for want of standing.
Events that repeat would prove slightly more difficult, but not much. Standing
would still focus on the age of the defendant’s act, rather than any metaphysical state
of the plaintiff. The question in repeating cases, though, would center on the
originality of the act. One could distinguish here between a mere clerical act that
does not imply a new decision, and an event that repeats through individual choices
by government officials. So, for example, a newly minted coin bears the motto “In
God We Trust.” That action by the mint, though, is no more than a routine act306
repeated more or less consistently since 1864.307 Such a practice, offering no change
McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 892-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
304

See supra note 78 and accompanying text.

305

McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 874.

306

This is true even setting aside possible coin redesign, which seems sure always to
include the motto. Indeed, the recent issuance of commemorative presidential dollars
illustrates this. For design purposes, the phrase was moved to the edge of the coins; an outcry
caused the mints to move the phrase back onto the reverse. There was never really a
possibility that coins would be issued without the motto. That did not stop an internet rumor
campaign alleging that the United States was “phasing God out of America.” See Historic
Change, SNOPES.COM, http://www.snopes.com/politics/religion/dollarcoin.asp (last visited
Mar. 28, 2012).
307

U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, History of ‘In God We Trust,’ http://www.treasury.gov/
about/education/Pages/in-god-we-trust.aspx. (last visited Mar. 28, 2012).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2012

43

458

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:415

from the status quo, would not be subject to challenge. It does not matter whether
the putative plaintiff was annoyed, intimidated, or even so paralyzed by opposition
to the motto that he found himself unable to use the money. The court should
dismiss the challenge as a challenge to a long-existing practice.
This differs from an official prayer at an annual graduation ceremony. Although
such a practice might be traced back for years or decades, each year presents a new
and distinct decision by some official to include the prayer, and a second decision as
to the prayer’s content. A member of the community concerned about such a
practice could bring a challenge, and the court should recognize this as the kind of
new religious speech that conveys standing. The court could then proceed to a
Lemon analysis, augmented, if it wished, by the use of the endorsement or coercion
tests. All three should produce the same results: the very factors of audience age and
independence that would indicate whether the event was coercive would also
demonstrate its purpose and primary effect. Just as with stationary monuments, in
these cases of repeated acts, courts would be spared the unhelpful exercise of
choosing the test to fit the desired result.
The toughest cases are those of monuments that are neither brand new nor
encrusted with the patina of ages. If one imagines a small town erecting a
monument to honor God on the courthouse steps, is the passage of five years
sufficient to exclude standing when a new member of the community does sue? To
answer such a puzzle, I would propose that the court look at the same sorts of factors
that appeared in Justice Breyer’s opinion: the age of the monument, the deliberation
and publicity that was given to its installation, and the behavior of the public in their
reaction to it.308
Consideration of factors like these, in the context of a Westphalian test, would
direct the court’s focus toward the extent to which the government speech in
question is truly a thing of the past. Current standing doctrine requires instead that
courts play an almost whimsical game of “is the plaintiff prevented from using this
area?” If the court finds that the plaintiff is, indeed, barred from the use of a public
place by an aggressively overhanging religious use, it must apply one of a variety of
tests, with no real guidance on which test to use. As a result, courts are often
allowed to choose the test that will reach the result the judge instinctively prefers.
This is the worst possible result; not only is the doctrine not clear, it is subject to
egregious acts of manipulation.
Thus the ultimate beneficiary of a Westphalian test for standing is thus the clarity
of the doctrine itself. The only compelling explanation for the cafeteria-style variety
of tests is that the courts find that Lemon at times fails to match their judicial
instincts. The abundance of other tests lets courts pick and choose and camouflage
instinctual behavior with the trappings of law. Allowing Westphalian standing to
screen out some cases and screen in others would relieve Lemon from that task and
allow it instead to sort the remaining sheep from the goats.
VII. “[A] CHRISTIAN AND UNIVERSAL PEACE?”309
In a far more gentle and civilized way, we find ourselves in much the same
position as the Europeans of the mid-seventeenth century. Groups on alternate sides
of religious questions in our polity view each other with the disdain once reserved
308

See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 702-03 (2005).

309

Westphalia, supra note 1, at art. I.
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for heretics. Each side believes itself to be put upon, excluded, or oppressed. It does
not take an outsider long to discover that each of these communities carries a deep
sense of victimization by “them”—some other group that actually runs the
country.310
Just as did the diplomats of Westphalia, we must call things off and demand
tolerance for all before things grow worse. Using current government activity as a
baseline for standing would ask both sides in the conflict to cease hostilities.
Advocates of non-religion would be unable to demand the removal of old
expressions of faith, springing from American experience of long ago. Advocates of
religion would be unable to demand new government proclamations of religion.
Such disputes have not served the nation well, and the best way to end this religious
war is to end the religious war. Perhaps the best way to do that is to reorient our
standing question in Establishment Clause cases from “Was it the legislature or the
executive that made the decision to spend the money?” or “Is this the kind of psychic
injury that conveys standing?” to “Is the government speaking religiously now, or is
this something that happened in the past?”
The current chaotic jurisprudence tends to apply a restrictive constitutional rule
when confronting a new act of government religious speech, and a permissive rule
when looking at an old one. Although such a system may prevent religious warfare,
it does so by adopting a series of distinctions that make little sense to onlookers.
Extreme groups on both sides can also manipulate these tests to advance their own
lines in the ongoing battles. The doctrine of the Establishment Clause ends up being
pulled and torn until it makes little sense even to those who author it.
A standing rule, in contrast, would allow the Court to reach results likely to
promote peace in a sensible way. A time-based rule would make sense to the public.
Other courts would find it easier to apply than the current grab-bag of available tests.
Critics might note that this way of resolving problems is artificial and pragmatic. A
rule of standing that finds injury only in current government action, though, is no
more artificial than a rule of standing that denies that there is harm in Psychic Injury,
but allows some cases to proceed based on Psychic Injury. A time-based rule is no
more artificial than a rule that recognizes injury from spending when done by the
legislature but not the executive. And pragmatic is not a bad thing to be.
Such an approach would fail to mollify the extremists on either side, but it might
calm enough combatants that many would be willing to lay down their metaphorical
arms before the battles worsen. For ultimately, our nation must continue to face the
question that Justice O’Connor asked us just before she left the Supreme Court:
“Why would we trade a system that has served us so well, for one that has served
others so poorly?”311
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For a thoughtful analysis of the problem, and a different possible solution, see Griffin,
supra note 3, at 25 (“[[T]he constitutional and political]environment now mistakenly favors
religion instead of religious liberty and fosters wars of religion instead of peaceful
tolerance.”).
311

McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 882 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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